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Abstract: This paper analyses the effect of financial distress risk on the initial compensation contracts 
of new executives in the UK, where credit markets are more concentrated than in the US. We find that 
financial distress risk has a negative and statistically significant impact on the level of cash-based 
compensation and total compensation of executives, who are newly hired from either outside or inside 
the firm. This negative impact is accentuated in firms with a high fraction of bank debt, suggesting that 
banks, as creditors, provide monitoring and influence initial executive compensation packages in firms 
with high financial distress risk. Additionally, we find that financial distress risk has a negative and 
significant impact on the fraction of equity-based compensation for both externally and internally 
appointed executives. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How firms with financial distress risk compensate executives can be important in 
determining these firms’ likelihood of survival. Despite the large body of literature on executive 
compensation, there are few studies on how financial distress risk influences executive 
compensation packages.1 The theoretical model of Berk et al. (2010) shows that firms with high 
leverage, i.e., high financial distress risk, pay their employees higher wages, as employees 
cannot insure their human capital risk against potential bankruptcy risk, and therefore demand a 
risk premium. In the presence of risk-averse employees and risk-neutral investors, an optimal 
labour contract offers compensation for the expected bankruptcy risk borne by the employees. 
Chang et al. (2016) use a sample of US firms and show that firms with significant financial 
distress risk offer larger compensation packages to their CEOs, consistent with the model of 
Berk et al. (2010). Further, Chemmanur et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence of a positive 
relation between leverage and executive compensation.  
These prior theoretical and empirical studies mainly focus on the US setting. Thus, our 
knowledge of how financial distress risk influences CEO compensation is limited. Indeed, some 
fundamental questions concerning how CEOs are paid in firms with financial distress risk 
remain unanswered: How does financial distress risk influence the level and structure of 
compensation for newly hired executives in an institutional environment where credit markets 
are more concentrated than in the US? Do creditors, for instance, banks, influence executive 
compensation packages in firms with financial distress risk? The aim of this paper is to answer 
                                                          
1 Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) examine executive compensation packages of US firms that filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy or privately restructured debt. These firms are described as ‘currently financially distressed’ rather than 
‘firms with financial distress risk’, which are the focus of this paper.  
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these questions by analysing executive pay packages in the UK. In an institutional set-up such 
as that in the UK, where credit markets are more concentrated, creditors can play an active 
monitoring role even before a firm experiences financial distress (Armour et al., 2002; 
McCormack, 2007; Marshall et al., 2014). Although previous studies document that there has 
been a convergence of CEO compensation practices in the UK toward those followed in the US, 
there is no empirical work on whether CEO compensation packages in the UK are designed 
similarly to those in the US when firms have high financial distress risk.2 Yermack (2006) 
argues that understanding CEO incentives requires looking beyond routine annual CEO 
compensation and examining the specific stages of a firm’s life cycle, such as how CEO 
incentives are shaped in a period when the firm has significant financial distress risk.   
Extant literature suggests that a state of financial distress can represent a major stage in 
the life cycle of firms, which can lead to substantial changes in the contracting features of 
managerial compensation (Senbet and Wang, 2010). Executives take on human capital risk 
when they accept job offers from firms with high financial distress risk (Berk et al. 2010; 
Chemmanur, et al., 2013; Chang et al. 2016), suggesting that these firms should offer relatively 
high levels of compensation to attract executives (‘human capital cost effect’).3 However, as 
financial distress risk increases, creditors would be expected to put pressure on firms to lower 
the fraction of equity-based compensation to reduce incentives for asset substitution 
                                                          
2 Conyon et al. (2011) provide evidence on the convergence of UK compensation packages, in terms of level and 
structure, toward those of the US.   
3 Eckbo et al. (2016) present the estimates of CEO human capital losses from corporate bankruptcy, accounting for 
CEO post-bankruptcy employment opportunities in US firms. Their findings imply an ex ante expected median 
personal bankruptcy cost of $2.7 million, or three times the typical annual CEO compensation. 
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(‘monitoring effect of creditors’).4 In turn, lower fractions of equity-based compensation lead to 
lower levels of total compensation (e.g., Fernandes et al., 2013).5 We also expect to observe a 
lower level of cash-based compensation if a CEO has limited discretion and his or her main task 
is to execute the business plan put together by the creditors of a firm with significant financial 
distress risk.  As Palia (2000) argues, when CEOs have less discretion (for instance, CEOs in a 
regulated sector), returns to ability are lower, and they will receive lower compensation. 
Overall, we might observe either a positive or negative relation between the level of executive 
compensation and financial distress risk, depending on which effect dominates, i.e., the ‘human 
capital cost effect’ or the ‘monitoring effect of creditors’. In this paper, we argue that the 
institutional set-up in which firms operate could play an important role in determining which of 
these effects is relatively more important.   
For our empirical analysis, we employ a sample of 3,614 newly appointed executives 
from 1,117 UK-listed non-financial firms over the period 1998 to 2009.6 We focus on 
executives who are newly hired, either from outside or inside the firm. We find that financial 
distress risk has a negative and statistically significant impact on the level of executive total 
compensation. Further, we observe that a strong creditor presence, i.e., a higher fraction of bank 
debt, leads to lower levels of executive total compensation in firms with high financial distress 
                                                          
4 See John and John (1993). Additionally, for US firms, Baird and Rasmussen (2006) provide qualitative evidence 
on the monitoring role of creditors outside of bankruptcy, while Gilson (1990) reports that bank lenders influence 
firm decisions, i.e., appointing new directors when firms enter Chapter 11 and become financially distressed.   
5 Risk-averse CEOs will naturally demand a pay premium for accepting the increased risk of equity-based pay (Hall 
and Murphy, 2002; Conyon et al., 2011). 
6 Chemmanur et al. (2013) and Chang et al. (2016) also use a sample of newly appointed executives as a way to 
mitigate endogeneity problems.  
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risk. This finding is consistent with creditors that provide monitoring as financial distress risk 
increases, thereby putting downward pressure on executive pay packages. Our results also 
indicate that financial distress risk has a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
fraction of equity-based compensation, along with other measures of executive incentives, 
including delta and vega.  This finding supports the view that concentrated credit markets in the 
UK allow creditors to provide monitoring and reduce risk-shifting incentives when firms face 
high financial distress risk.  
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, it extends the literature on 
executive compensation by focusing on how financial distress risk influences the level and 
structure of executive compensation in an institutional set-up with relatively more concentrated 
credit markets. Bryan et al. (2010) investigate how the legal environment influences the 
structure of executive compensation, i.e., the fraction of equity-based compensation. Their 
findings show that firms offer higher equity-based compensation in countries where shareholder 
protection is stronger, e.g., the UK and US. Chang et al. (2016) find a positive relationship 
between the total compensation of newly hired CEOs and financial distress risk measures for a 
sample of US firms. In contrast, our findings show that there is a negative and statistically 
significant association between executive total compensation and financial distress risk in the 
UK. Despite the fact that both the UK and the US have strong shareholder protection and a 
dispersed share ownership structure, they differ in terms of the structure of their credit markets, 
which can lead to different ways of incentivising executives when firms have high financial 
distress risk.   
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Second, we contribute to the literature on the monitoring role of creditors by investigating 
whether creditors influence initial executive compensation packages in firms with significant 
financial distress risk. Marshall et al. (2014) show that banks play an important monitoring role 
in CEO succession in UK firms, which mainly rely on bank financing as a source of debt capital 
rather than corporate bond financing, as in the US. We extend this literature by providing 
evidence on the role of bank monitoring in determining the level of the initial executive total 
compensation of newly hired executives. Our results also support the theoretical model by 
Aghion and Bolton (1992), suggesting that creditors exert influence over corporate policies, 
including executive compensation packages, even in the absence of payment default (that is, in 
firms with high financial distress risk) under strong creditor protection.7 In their theoretical 
model, debt is a mechanism for contingent control. The main intuition is that the creditor has 
control in the bad state, e.g., a state of high financial distress risk, allowing him or her to receive 
a relatively higher return as a consequence of the firm now pursuing more creditor-friendly 
actions. In turn, the creditor relaxes the firm’s financial constraints and thereby improves the 
prospects of recovery.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature 
review and presents a discussion on the institutional background of the UK. Section 3 discusses 
the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis.  
Section 5 presents additional tests, and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
7 Roberts and Sufi (2009) provide a literature survey on financial contracting and creditor monitoring. They 
highlight that prior literature uses covenants as a measure of creditor governance in US firms. In contrast to the rules 
in the US, the disclosure requirements in the UK are far less comprehensive in terms of providing full information 
about the details of covenants (Chatterjee, 2006). The syndicate loan data from the Dealscan database are relatively 
limited for UK firms. Thus, we cannot incorporate covenants in our analysis. 
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2.  Literature Review 
2.1. Financial distress risk and executive compensation 
Existing empirical literature on the relationship between financial distress risk and 
executive compensation is limited and mainly based on evidence from the US, where debt 
markets are relatively more dispersed and firms rely on corporate bond markets rather than 
private debt (e.g., bank debt). Chang et al. (2016) study the relation between financial distress 
risk and executive compensation using a sample of 2,347 new CEOs in US firms.8 They find 
that new CEOs at firms with high levels of financial distress risk receive higher total 
compensation and equity-based compensation than those at firms with low financial distress 
risk. This finding of a positive relation between total compensation and financial distress risk is 
consistent with the view that executives in firms with financial distress risk receive higher 
compensation, reflecting their human capital risk (Berk et al., 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2013; 
Titman, 1984). Chang et al. (2016) interpret their finding of higher equity-based compensation 
in firms with high financial distress risk as firms providing more incentives for CEOs to take a 
less conservative approach in their decision-making, which could lead to a decline in 
shareholder wealth.   
However, in their empirical analysis, Chang et al. (2016) do not consider the interests of 
creditors in firms with financial distress risk. As John and John (1993) demonstrate in their 
theoretical model, the optimal structure of managerial compensation depends not only on the 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, but also on agency problems that arise 
                                                          
8 In contrast to Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), who examine CEO compensation in financially distressed firms, i.e., 
those that either filed for Chapter 11 or privately restructured their debt, Chang et al. (2016)’s focus is on firms with 
financial distress risk rather than firms that are currently financially distressed.   
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from the conflicts of interest between debtholders and shareholders. An increase in equity-based 
compensation in firms with financial distress risk could create risk-shifting incentives for 
managers, which would be undesirable for debtholders. If debtholders are active in monitoring 
executive compensation, the relationship between financial distress risk and equity-based 
compensation could change. In an environment where debt markets are concentrated, creditors 
will have more incentives and opportunities to provide monitoring and influence CEO 
compensation by reducing executives’ risk-shifting incentives for firms with financial distress 
risk. For instance, Fama (1985) argues that banks are more likely to provide effective 
monitoring than public bondholders due to their concentrated holdings, credible threats and 
superior access to private information. Monitoring mitigates moral hazard problems, enabling 
banks to detect a firm’s opportunistic behaviour and to start renegotiation or liquidation (Park, 
2000). Thus, we expect that financial distress risk has a negative impact on executive equity-
based incentives, i.e., equity-based compensation, delta and vega, and total compensation.9 In 
the next section, we provide further discussion on the institutional characteristics of the UK 
setting, which can influence the cash-based components (i.e., salary and bonus) of executive 
compensation, as well as equity-based compensation. 
 
2.2. Institutional background in the UK and managerial discretion in firms with financial 
distress risk 
                                                          
9 Lower equity-based compensation leads to lower levels of total compensation, as risk-averse CEOs will naturally 
demand a lesser pay premium for accepting the reduced risk of equity-based pay (Hall and Murphy, 2002; Conyon 
et al., 2011). 
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The UK offers an interesting environment to study the impact of financial distress risk on 
executive compensation. The UK and US share similar governance systems, i.e., their public 
companies have widely dispersed share ownership structures (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999).  
However, there are considerable differences between the UK and US in terms of corporate debt 
markets.10 In the UK, corporate bond issuance in public debt markets is relatively rare, and 
firms rely more on private debt financing, i.e., bank and non-bank private debt (Marshall et al., 
2016).11 There is a concentrated creditor structure in the UK, while debt markets are dispersed 
in the US.12 When firms in the UK face high financial distress risk, the concentrated structure of 
debt markets allows creditors to work together and decide whether, and on what terms, a 
company is worth supporting in the long term.13   
In the 1980s, the Bank of England developed a private consensual workout procedure for 
large companies that experience financial problems. This approach has been called ‘The 
London Approach’. The aim was to promote an effective and efficient financial system, and 
maintain financial stability (Kent, 1997; Armour et al., 2002). A lead bank, which is the bank 
                                                          
10 See Cheffins (2001), Allen and Gale (2001) and Larcker and Tayan (2011) regarding similarities between the UK 
and US governance systems. 
11 For a sample of 400 non-financial firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange over the 
period 2000 to 2012, Marshall et al. (2016) report that the mean (median) bank debt-to-total debt ratio is 
approximately 0.60 (0.71), while the mean (median) public debt-to-total debt ratio is 0.24 (0.00), and the mean 
(median)  non-bank private debt-to-total debt ratio  is 0.15 (0.00). 
12 Brecht (2015) compares debt capital markets in the US and Europe. He reports that 80 percent of the corporate 
debt in the US comes from corporate bond markets, while approximately 20 percent is from banks. It is almost the 
reverse in Europe and the UK, where firms rely mainly on bank debt (approximately 80 percent), and a very small 
proportion (approximately 20 percent) comes from corporate bond markets. Further, in the US, banks tend to 
securitize or sell their loans in a well-developed loan market, while in Europe, including the UK, banks hold a much 
larger proportion of loans on bank balance sheets. 
13 Davydenko and Franks (2008) document that the incidence of formal insolvencies is relatively lower in the UK 
than in France and Germany, despite strong creditor control rights in the UK. Creditors, i.e., banks, in the UK 
coordinate informal rescues (Armour and Frisby, 2001). Creditors use mostly informal workouts to help companies 
survive. 
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with the largest exposure to the ailing firm, is designated to facilitate discussions among 
creditors and come up with a business plan.14 Creditors could decide to maintain credit lines and 
extend further financing for the firm, conditional on an agreed business plan. Meanwhile, there 
might be management changes and a reorganization of the firm’s assets, including the sales of 
assets. A manager hired at this stage will have his or her main responsibility toward creditors, 
who put together a business plan to be executed as part of the restructuring process, 
highlighting creditors’ interests.15 As part of this process, a company does not have much 
autonomy, as it is subject to the dictates of its lender banks during the restructuring stage. This 
approach is based on the view that creditors are likely to achieve better outcomes if they 
collectively support an orderly rescue of an ailing firm rather than force it into a formal 
insolvency.  
 Franks and Sussman (2005) use a sample of small- and medium-sized UK firms and find 
that banks, as secured creditors, play an important role in encouraging and forcing financially 
distressed firms to restructure their operations, which might include management changes and 
downsizing. Thus, an elaborate corporate rescue process, i.e., the London Approach, might take 
place outside formal procedures.16 
Another important difference between the UK and US debt markets is the lender liability 
rule (e.g., Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). This rule operates in the US, but not in the UK; 
                                                          
14 Recently Yell Group negotiated with its lenders over restructuring its £3.7 billion debt, and creditors were led by 
HSBC (Financial Times, September 22, 2008). The main creditors were RBS, HSBC and Deutsche Bank. 
15 Overall, the London Approach is a debtor-in-possession restructuring process.   
16 Marshall et al. (2014) offer further evidence on creditor monitoring in UK firms. They examine whether banks 
provide monitoring in determining the relation between forced CEO turnover and firm performance in UK firms.  
They find that the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover increases with bank debt on a firm’s balance sheet, while 
public debt does not have a significant impact on CEO succession.   
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consequently, US banks can suffer major costs in the aftermath of a firm’s failure if they are 
judged to have taken actions that improve their position at the expense of other claimants.  The 
lender liability rule discourages US banks from active engagement in the management of a firm 
with significant financial distress risk prior to formal bankruptcy (see, e.g., Fischel, 1989).  
Considering the lack of lender liability in the UK, we would expect banks to be willing to play a 
monitoring role, as long as they have a large stake in a firm.   
Given these institutional characteristics of the UK setting, which emphasize the 
monitoring role of creditors at firms with high financial distress risk, a CEO’s main role in these 
firms can be viewed as that of a manager executing the business plan of creditors, with limited 
discretion in corporate decision-making. When CEOs have less discretion, returns to ability are 
lower, and they will receive lower compensation (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Palia, 2000). As 
Gilson and Vetsuypens (1994) argue, creditors would not necessarily be interested in hiring a 
high-quality CEO, since their main interest is to receive their payment, without necessarily 
maximizing the going-concern value of the firm. Thus, we predict that financial distress risk has 
a negative impact on the level of cash-based components of compensation, i.e., salary and 
bonus, and total compensation.  
Additionally, Prendergast (2002) argues that in uncertain environments where there is no 
delegation of responsibility to an agent, and the agent is monitored on the basis of his or her 
inputs, he will not receive output-based incentive pay. The set-up used by Prendergast’s model 
is similar to the UK set-up for firms with significant financial distress risk, where managers do 
not have full discretion over their choice of activities as part of corporate policy decision-
making. Thus, the lack of managerial discretion reduces the need for performance-based 
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incentives, i.e., CEO equity-based pay, and should again lead to a negative relationship between 
financial distress risk and equity-based pay.   
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.1. Data sources and sample selection 
          To investigate the effect of financial distress risk on executive compensation, we 
assemble a dataset on executive compensation variables, financial distress risk measures, firm-
specific control variables and governance variables. Our sample construction process starts with 
collecting executive compensation data from the Boardex database. Executive compensation 
data include salaries, bonuses, values of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), stock awards and 
stock options that are granted within a given year. Our compensation measure is based on the 
first full year of the new executives’ tenure. If the tenure is less than one year, then we include 
the compensation for the second year in that position, since the first year’s compensation may 
reflect less than a full year’s pay for executives with tenure less than one year.17 Some 
executives are offered equity-based compensation and bonuses in the year they are hired, but 
not in their second year. In this situation, equity-based compensation shows up on the Boardex 
database in the first year that the executive is hired. In our analysis, we include the initial year’s 
equity-based compensation and bonus. 
Cash-based compensation is the sum of salary and cash bonuses, while equity-based 
compensation is the sum of the value of LTIPs, stock awards, and stock options granted during 
a year. Additionally, we consider delta and vega as alternative measures of an executive’s 
                                                          
17 For a similar approach, please refer to Berry et al. (2006). 
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incentives. Delta is defined as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price. Thus, CEOs with a 
high delta will have incentives to take up projects that increase the share price. Vega is defined 
as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm risk. It measures how CEO wealth changes in response 
to changes in stock return volatility. CEOs with a high vega are expected to make risky 
investment choices, as they seek to benefit from the higher volatility associated with risky 
investments.  
Our sample consists of 3,614 firm-years with new executive appointments of both CEOs 
and other executive directors from 1,117 UK-listed non-financial firms over the period 1998 to 
2009. We have an unbalanced panel with firms joining only when they hire new executives in a 
particular year during the sample period. We restrict our sample to newly appointed executives 
as a means of eliminating the confounding effects of prior performance on executives’ current 
compensation.18  CEO (non-CEO executive) appointments constitute 1,059 (2,555) of the 3,614 
new executive appointments. We observe that there are 458 (601) external (internal) CEO 
appointments. For non-CEO executive appointments, there are 1,204 external appointments, 
while the number of internal appointments is 1,351.  
Further, we collect data on bank debt from the Capital IQ database. Bank debt data are 
available for 2,622 of the 3,614 new executive appointments in our sample. In examining the 
relation between executive compensation and financial distress risk, we control for various 
firm-specific characteristics, including firm performance, size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, cash 
holdings and stock return volatility. In addition, we control for governance variables, including 
institutional ownership, proportion of independent directors, and executive characteristics. 
                                                          
18 Chang et al. (2016) also focus on newly appointed CEOs. 
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Table A1 in the Appendix provides detailed definitions for the variables used in our empirical 
analysis.  
 
3.2. Measures of financial distress risk 
We employ three alternative measures of financial distress risk. Our first measure is 
based on the theories of BSM (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974), in which the 
probability that a firm enters bankruptcy is the probability that the (book) value of its liabilities 
exceeds the (market) value of its assets at a point in time. We employ the method set out in the 
paper of Hillegeist et al. (2004) to calculate default risk using this model. Our second measure 
of financial distress risk is a discrete time hazard model taken from Chava and Jarrow (2004), 
who emphasize the importance of industry effects on bankruptcy prediction. We employ their 
“public firm model with industry effects” (Table 3, page 556). This model incorporates both 
market and accounting-based variables. Our third measure is the z-score model of Altman 
(1968), in which the bankruptcy or failure risk of a firm is based on a linear combination of 
accounting ratios. The selected ratios reflect a firm’s working capital position, profitability, 
gearing and efficiency (with which assets are used to generate sales).19  
Our analysis requires us to identify firms with financial distress risk; therefore, we 
convert probabilities of default into categories of financial distress risk. We employ a 0.25% 
probability of default/bankruptcy via the BSM model to separate low financial distress risk 
firms from medium financial distress risk firms, and a 2.5% probability of default/bankruptcy to 
separate medium and high distress risk firms.20 These rates (approximately) reflect the 
                                                          
19 We employ the version of the model reported in Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Shumway (2001), in which all of the 
coefficients, other than that on Sales/Total assets, are multiplied by 100.    
20 These cut-offs are also employed by Chang et al. (2016). 
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probability of default for firms just above (BBB/BBB-) and below (B+/B) the investment grade 
barrier; between 1981 and 2010, the average annual one-year default rate for European firms 
with an investment grade S&P rating of BBB (BBB-) was 0.09% (0.32%), while the average 
rate for sub-investment grade B+ (B) rated firms was 1.77% (4.78%). This gives us a sample of 
367 executive appointments to firms with high financial distress risk (RISKHigh) and 346 
executive appointments to firms with medium financial distress risk (RISKMed). Therefore, in 
total, 713 (367 + 346) appointments are to firms that we deem as having significant financial 
distress, and 2,901 appointments are to firms that we deem as having no significant financial 
distress risk. We similarly allocate 367 (346) firms to the high (medium) risk categories based 
on Chava and Jarrow’s and Altman’s models. As a robustness check, we adopt alternative cut-
offs based on natural break-points in our sample distributions under Chava and Jarrow’s and 
Altman’s measures. We find that the results are qualitatively similar. 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our variables. We observe that Altman’s model 
provides significantly higher estimates of financial distress risk, relative to the BSM and Chava 
and Jarrow’s models. The mean (median) probability of default (bankruptcy) for Altman’s 
model is 15.80% (6.30 %), compared to 1.20% (0.00%) for the BSM model and 0.50% (0.20%) 
for Chava and Jarrow’s model. Hillegeist et al. (2004) report that, for their sample, the actual 
average bankruptcy rate for solvent firm years is 0.87% vs. an average estimate 13.46% based 
on the z-score model of Altman (1968).21 Given that our sample consists of UK-listed firms, the 
estimates of default risk under Altman’s model are evidently exaggerated. However, this does 
                                                          
21 See Table 3, page 16, Hillegeist et al. (2004). 
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not preclude the model from being a useful measure of relative bankruptcy risk (Chen and Hill, 
2013).  
In our analysis, we use both cash-based, which is the sum of bonuses and salaries, and 
equity-based components of total compensation. The average (median) total compensation for 
our sample of newly hired executives is £526,121 (£267, 281), and the average (median) 
fraction of equity-based compensation is 0.229 (0.171). The large difference between the mean 
and median for total compensation suggests that our compensation data are skewed to the right. 
The average value of equity-based compensation is £227,362, while the median value of equity-
based compensation is £36,019. The large difference between the mean and median values of 
equity-based compensation results from the fact that not all firms in our sample pay their 
executives equity-based compensation. Even firms that use equity-based compensation do not 
necessarily grant it every year. We observe that the average (median) delta is £19,333 (£4,864), 
while the average (median) vega is £3,055 (£640).   
The average (median) sales is £1,227.4 (£95.3) million, and the difference between the 
average and median value shows that our sales variable has a skewed distribution. In our 
empirical analysis, we employ the percentage of bank debt as a measure of bank monitoring. On 
average, the percentage of total debt made up of bank debt is 66.9. This ratio of bank debt to 
total debt is comparable to previous studies that use UK data; for example, Marshall et al. 
(2016) report that the mean (median) bank debt ratio is 0.60 (0.71) for their sample of FTSE-
350 firms over the period 2000-2012, while Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) show that the mean 
(median) bank debt ratio is 0.57 (0.63) for their sample of 839 UK public firms from 1995 to 
1999. The average age of newly hired executives is 47.6 years, and 46 % of the new executives 
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in our sample are hired from outside the company. Marshall et al. (2014) find that externally 
hired CEOs constitute 40.1% of all successions in their sample of UK firms. We also report 
descriptive statistics for firm-specific characteristics and governance variables in Table 1. On 
average, 37.1 percent of directors are independent, and the average institutional ownership 
concentration is 54.7 percent.   
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
3.4. Empirical methodology 
To examine the relationship between financial distress risk and executive compensation, 
we employ the following regression model:  
 
Compensationit = α + β1 RISKMedit + β2 RISKHighit + γ Controlsit + εit 
 
where Compensationit is measured as the natural log of total compensation and its components, 
including equity-based compensation, cash-based compensation (the sum of salaries and 
bonuses), and the fraction of equity-based compensation, delta and vega. Controls include 
firms-specific variables, executive-specific variables, and governance variables, which are used 
as determinants of compensation by prior studies. We also control for year and industry fixed 
effects. 
        Considering the potential concerns regarding the causality between executive 
compensation and financial distress risk, we follow Chang et al. (2016) and include in our 
sample only those firms that have a newly hired executive. Thus, we examine how the initial 
compensation packages of these new executives are influenced by financial distress risk.   
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Our key explanatory variables are the financial distress risk variables, RISKHigh, which 
is a dummy variable for firms with high financial distress risk, and RISKMed, which is a 
dummy variable for firms with medium (moderate) financial distress risk, as discussed in 
Section 3.2.  Following previous studies on executive compensation, we control for firm-
specific variables in our regression model, including sales as a measure of firm size, Tobin’s Q 
as a measure of growth opportunities, stock return and return on assets (ROA) as measures of 
firm performance, and cash holdings as a measure of liquidity constraints. If firms experience a 
scarcity of cash, they may use equity-based compensation to preserve it. We also use leverage 
and stock return volatility, which are viewed as measures of firm risk, as additional firm-
specific controls. Moreover, we control for governance variables comprising the proportion of 
independent directors, ownership of institutional shareholders, and executive-specific 
characteristics, including executive age, a dummy for CEOs and a dummy for executives hired 
externally. Further, in our robustness tests, we include some proxies for managerial talent, i.e., 
college education, MBA, and the number of current board positions (e.g., Fernandes et al., 
2013). We also include industry dummies that are based on the 12 Fama-French industries, and 
year dummies in all of our regressions.  
Institutional investors have more incentives to provide intense monitoring as their 
ownership concentration increases (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Ozkan, 2011). In the UK, a 
large proportion of equity capital is held by institutional investors,22 typically in block 
shareholdings. Such ownership concentration provides incentives for institutional investors to 
engage in monitoring. We consider the holdings of financial institutions that own 3% or more 
                                                          
22 The UK Office of National Statistics (ONS, 2012) reports that at the end of 2008, institutional ownership 
accounted for 74.2% of the share ownership of UK-listed firms. 
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of a firm’s equity as a percentage of the total institutional holdings. To compensate for the 
utility loss that can be created by intense monitoring, CEOs at firms with more independent 
boards and/or a higher proportion of institutional investors require higher compensation 
(Fernandes et al., 2013; Ozkan, 2007). Conversely, boards might have an incentive to signal 
their independence by lowering the level of CEO compensation (Singh, 2006).  
Murphy (1985) stresses the importance of controlling for executive-specific variables 
when studying executive compensation. We employ three executive characteristic variables. 
Younger executives have higher lifetime human capital at risk, which is captured by Age, the 
age of the executive in years. Career concerns can be an important source of incentives for 
CEOs, even when they receive incentive contracts as part of their compensation packages 
(Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). These career concerns would be weakest for CEOs who are close 
to retirement age. Thus, CEOs approaching retirement age should be offered more explicit 
incentives than younger CEOs. We also use a dummy variable, External Hire dummy, which 
equals one if the new executive is hired from outside the company, and zero otherwise; while 
new internal executives have a larger amount of firm-specific managerial capital at stake, new 
external executives are hired for their (transferable) managerial ability. Gilson and Vetsuypens 
(1993), Murphy (2002) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) all show that executives hired from 
the outside earn significantly more than those promoted internally. Murphy and Zabojnik 
(2006) interpret this result by arguing that the relative importance of general over firm-specific 
managerial ability leads to higher compensation for external versus internal hires. Finally, we 
use a dummy variable, CEO dummy, which equals one for new CEOs, and zero for other new 
executive directors.  
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We observe that 39% (1,411/3,614) of new executives receive no equity-based 
compensation. There are also some firm year observations where delta and vega equal zero.  
Thus, we employ a Tobit estimation method for regressions of the level of equity-based 
compensation, fraction of equity-based compensation, delta and vega (Ozkan, 2011; Fernandes 
et al., 2013). Similarly, in our regressions for bonuses, we use Tobit estimation, since 
executives do not receive a bonus every year, and we have some firm-year observations where 
the bonus is equal to zero. We observe that 36 % (1,294/3,614) of new executives receive no 
bonus.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Preliminary analysis 
 
       Table 2 reports a preliminary analysis of the relationship between financial distress risk and 
executive compensation. We divide our sample into deciles, according to each measure of 
financial distress risk (BSM, Chava and Jarrow, and Altman). Table 2 presents the mean and 
median values of salary, bonus, equity-based compensation, total compensation, fraction of 
equity-based compensation, delta and vega by decile. We observe that the estimated financial 
distress risk is negligibly small, up to the 8th decile (for the BSM and Chava and Jarrow 
measures), after which it increases considerably. For the BSM model, for example, the mean 
(median) value of financial distress risk for the 8th decile is 0.10% (0.10%), which increases to 
10.9% (7.7%) for the 10th decile. Under Chava and Jarrow’s model, the mean (median) value of 
financial distress risk for the 8th decile is 0.40% (0.30%), compared to 2.60% (1.2%) for the 10th 
decile. Under all financial distress risk models (BSM, Chava and Jarrow, and Altman) we 
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observe that as financial distress risk increases from the 8th to 10th decile, the average (median) 
total compensation level and fraction of equity-based compensation decline. For instance, under 
the BSM model, the mean (median) level of total compensation for the 8th decile is £535,179 
(£263,186), while it is £316,287 (£177,282) for the 10th decile. Thus, we observe that there is a 
40.90% (32.64%) reduction in the mean (median) level of total compensation. The fraction of 
equity compensation follows a similar pattern. In terms of managerial incentives, the results 
show that, under the BSM model, the mean (median) deltas are £19,578 (£4,152) and £7,432 
(£1,101) for the 8th and 10th deciles, respectively. The corresponding figures for vega are £2,695 
(£383) and £894 (£115).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. Baseline regressions 
Next, we present the results of our baseline regressions. Table 3 reports the results of our 
regression analyses regarding the impact of financial distress risk on the level and structure of 
executive compensation for our sample of 3,614 newly hired executives. In Panel A of Table 3, 
we examine the impact of financial distress risk on the different components of cash-based 
executive compensation: salary and bonus, and cash-based compensation. We observe that 
newly hired executives at firms with medium and high financial distress risk receive relatively 
lower salaries, bonuses and cash-based compensation than those at firms with low financial 
distress risk, controlling for other firm and executive-specific variables. This finding is 
consistent with the view that in the UK, executives have less managerial discretion when firms 
face high financial distress risk. As argued by prior researchers, lower managerial discretion 
leads to lower returns to managerial skill, and therefore lower compensation (Finkelstein and 
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Boyd, 1998; Palia, 2000). As financial distress risk increases, creditors increase their 
monitoring, leading to a decline in managerial discretion, as discussed in Section 2.2. For all 
three measures of financial distress risk, the coefficient estimates on the high and medium risk 
variables in columns (1) to (9) are negative and mostly statistically significant.  
Panel B of Table 3, columns (1) to (6) report the estimation results for equity-based 
compensation and total compensation, which mirror our results in Panel A, that is, of a negative 
relationship between equity-based compensation, total compensation, and financial distress risk, 
again with more negative coefficients observed for the high financial distress risk group than 
the medium financial distress risk group. Our results contrast with those of Chang et al. (2016), 
who find a positive association between new CEO equity-based compensation and financial 
distress risk. They interpret this finding as CEOs receiving more incentives to act in a less 
conservative manner, as they would have a tendency to take less risk to avoid corporate failure.   
In columns (7) to (9) of Panel B, we test the impact of financial distress risk on the 
structure of executive compensation. We observe that the coefficient estimate for high financial 
distress risk is negative and statistically significant in columns (7) to (9). This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms with financial distress risk would offer lower equity-
based compensation in their attempt to avoid asset substitution problems. Less negative 
coefficients are observed for medium versus high distress risk firms, as would be expected, 
given the relatively stronger concerns regarding asset substitution in firms with high financial 
distress risk.   
Overall, our findings support the results from previous studies, which document that 
firms with severe conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt holders, i.e., firms with 
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high financial distress risk, reduce agency costs of debt by offering their executives lower 
equity-based compensation and lower incentive alignment with shareholders (e.g., Ortiz-
Molina, 2007). In setting managerial compensation packages, firms not only consider the 
alignment of interests of shareholders and managers, but also the interests of debt holders (John 
and John, 1993). It is also noteworthy that the impact of financial distress risk on the level and 
structure of new executive compensation is economically significant. For example, under the 
BSM model, the coefficients on RISKHigh (RISKMed) reported in column (4) of Panel B 
indicate that new executives at firms with high (medium) risk of financial distress earn 
approximately 30.3% (23.4%) less. Considering the average marginal effects on RISKHigh 
(RISKMed), we find that the fraction of equity-based pay in executives’ compensation packages 
in firms with high (medium) financial distress risk is 9.9% (5.4%) lower than such packages at 
firms with low financial distress risk.    
We also observe a positive and significant relation between executive age and the level of 
total compensation; however, we also note a negative and significant relation between executive 
age and the fraction of equity-based compensation, i.e., older executives receive more 
compensation and a lower fraction of equity-based compensation. Our findings do not suggest 
that externally hired executives receive a higher level of compensation than internally hired 
executives. This finding is contrary to the results of Brockman et al. (2012), who find that 
externally hired CEOs receive higher levels of compensation. We observe that a higher 
proportion of independent directors is associated with higher levels of total compensation and a 
higher fraction of equity-based compensation.  
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In Panel C, we first examine the relation between financial distress risk and new 
executives’ pay-performance sensitivity (delta), and then the relation between distress risk and 
pay-risk sensitivity (vega). We measure the new executive’s delta as the sterling change in the 
executive’s wealth for a 1% change in his firm’s stock price and vega as the sterling change in 
wealth associated with a 0.01 change in stock volatility. We find that performance incentives 
for new executives decrease with financial distress risk, as evidenced by the negative and 
mostly significant coefficient estimates on the distress risk variables. The results are in line with 
those of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Jin (2002), suggesting that firms with higher risk 
might have to trade-off the benefits of incentives against the benefits of risk-sharing 
(Holmstrom, 1979). Additionally, we show that new executives at firms with higher distress 
risk also have fewer risk-taking incentives, consistent with the view that these firms provide 
managers with weaker risk-taking incentives to mitigate the agency cost of debt and to help 
ensure firm survival. By contrast, Chang et al. (2016) find that US firms with high financial 
distress risk offer high equity-based compensation to their CEOs, which is interpreted as firms 
attempting to encourage CEOs to take a less conservative approach, as this approach could lead 
to a decline in shareholder wealth.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5. Additional Tests 
 
  Next, we investigate whether the relation between financial distress risk and executive 
compensation varies across different types of firms and different types of executives. We also 
conduct further robustness tests.  
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5.1. The impact of bank debt on the compensation contracts of newly hired executives in firms 
with high financial distress risk 
 
In this section, we investigate whether a strong creditor presence, i.e., a higher fraction of 
bank debt, can influence the relation between executive compensation and financial distress 
risk. Previous studies argue that banks, as creditors, provide more effective monitoring than 
public bondholders (Fama, 1985). However, creditor strength also depends on the level of 
leverage, since creditors have more incentives to monitor highly leveraged firms (Milidonis and 
Stathopoulos, 2014). These highly levered firms have greater agency costs of debt, as they are 
more likely to have underinvestment and asset substitution problems. Thus, banks as creditors 
would have more incentives to monitor firms that are highly levered.  
For our sample of firms, we collect data for the ratio of bank debt to total debt. Following 
Lin et al. (2013), we compute bank debt as the sum of term loans and revolving credit. We then 
sort our firms, first into two groups with leverage above and below the median, and second into 
four groups with the bank debt ratio above and below the median. Thus, the high bank debt 
group includes firms with both leverage and the ratio of bank debt to total debt above the 
median, while the low bank debt group consists of firms with both leverage and the ratio of 
bank debt to total debt below the median. We expect the negative impact of financial distress 
risk on executive total compensation to be stronger in the high bank debt group than the low 
bank debt group. As discussed in Section 2, creditors will reduce equity-based incentives, as 
they would be concerned about asset-substitution incentives. Further, a relatively strong creditor 
presence in the high bank debt group will limit managerial discretion and reduce the returns to 
managerial skill, which would lead to lower cash-based compensation, i.e., sum of salary and 
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bonus. Consequently, we expect total compensation in firms with high distress risk to be lower 
in the high bank debt group than in the low bank debt group. 
          Table 4 presents the regressions of total compensation, cash-based compensation, and 
fraction of equity-based compensation for firms in the low bank debt and high bank debt 
groups. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results of total compensation.  In column (1), 
we observe that the coefficients for RISKMed and RISKHigh are mostly negative but 
statistically insignificant for low bank debt firms. However, in column (2), when we consider 
high bank debt firms, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for RISKMed 
and RISKHigh under BSM and C&J. For the Altman’s measure of financial distress risk, the 
coefficients for RISKMed and RISKHigh are still negative but statistically insignificant. We 
conclude that our primary result of a negative and statistically significant impact of financial 
distress risk on total compensation is driven by high bank debt firms. Overall, the ‘monitoring 
effect of creditors’ seems to dominate rather than the ‘human capital cost effect’ in our sample 
of high bank debt firms, leading to a negative and statistically significant relation between 
financial distress risk and the total compensation of newly appointed executives. Our findings 
are consistent with the view that banks can play an important monitoring role in UK firms, as 
they rely much more on bank lending rather than public corporate bond markets.23 
         Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 examine the effect of financial distress risk on cash-based 
compensation for low bank debt and high bank debt firms, respectively. We observe that the 
impact of financial distress risk on cash-based compensation is statistically insignificant for low 
                                                          
23 We also test whether the coefficient estimates for RISKMed and RISKHigh are statistically significantly different 
between the high bank debt and low bank debt subsamples for the total compensation regressions. For the distress 
measures BSM and C&J, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for RISKHigh is greater (or equal) in the 
high bank debt subsample than that in the low bank debt subsample, showing that the negative impact of high 
financial distress risk on total compensation is statistically significantly greater in the high bank debt subsample. 
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bank debt firms.  In column (3), the coefficients for RISKMed and RISKHigh are mainly 
negative and statistically insignificant under the BSM and C&J models. In column (4), the 
coefficients for RISKMed and RISKHigh are negative and statistically significant for high bank 
debt firms under the BSM and C&J models.24 Thus, we observe that our primary finding of a 
negative and statistically significant impact of financial distress risk on cash-based 
compensation is driven by high bank debt firms.  Similar to the findings in columns (1) and (2) 
for total compensation, our results for cash-based compensation suggest that creditors can 
provide monitoring and influence compensation levels of newly appointed executives in UK 
firms.  
Columns (5) and (6) show the results of regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the fraction of equity-based compensation. Column (5) presents regressions for low bank debt 
firms. We find that the coefficients for RISKMed and RISKHigh are mostly negative, but 
statistically insignificant for low bank debt firms. One exception is the coefficient estimate for 
RISKMed under the C&J model, which is negative and statistically significant at 10% level. 
Column (6) presents the results for high bank debt firms. We observe that the coefficients for 
RISKMed and RISKHigh are all negative but statistically insignificant, however, the coefficient 
for RISKHigh under the BSM model is statistically significant at a 5% level. Thus, we have 
some evidence that high bank debt firms reduce the fraction of equity-based compensation 
                                                          
24 We also test whether the coefficient estimates for RISKMed and RISKHigh are statistically significantly different 
between the high bank debt and low bank debt subsamples for the cash-based compensation regressions. For the 
distress measures BSM and C&J, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for RISKHigh is greater (or equal) 
in the high bank debt subsample than that in the low bank debt subsample, showing that the negative impact of 
medium and high financial distress risk on cash-based compensation is statistically significantly greater in the high 
bank debt subsample. 
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when they face high financial distress risk. This finding suggests that creditors provide 
monitoring and reduce the fraction of equity-based compensation, which could increase 
incentives for risk-shifting in firms with high financial distress risk. While both the UK and US 
belong to the Anglo-Saxon governance system, they have considerable differences in their 
corporate debt markets. These differences in the debt markets seem to lead to different ways of 
compensating CEOs when firms face financial distress risk. For our sample of UK firms, we 
find that newly appointed executives receive a lower fraction of equity-based compensation in 
firms with high financial distress risk, while Chang et al. (2016) document a positive and 
significant relationship between equity-based compensation and financial distress risk in US 
firms, where credit markets are relatively more dispersed. These findings suggest that the 
structure of debt markets can play an important role in determining how executives at firms 
with high financial distress risk are incentivized. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.2. The impact of executive type on the compensation contracts of newly hired executives in 
firms with high financial distress risk 
 
In this section, we investigate whether the relationship between financial distress risk and 
executive compensation holds across different executive types. Specifically, we examine CEOs 
versus non-CEO executives, internally versus externally hired executives, and young versus old 
executives.25 Bebchuk et al. (2002) suggest that CEOs may have more influence on their 
compensation than other directors, suggesting that there may be a difference between the 
                                                          
25 For brevity, we report only the coefficient estimates for medium and high financial distress risk dummies. 
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impact of financial distress risk on CEO compensation and the compensation of non-CEO 
executives. Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) argue that an increase in the relative importance of 
general managerial skills (rather than firm-specific skills) has led to a pay premium for 
executives hired externally, relative to those promoted internally. Thus, we would expect higher 
compensation for executives hired externally than those promoted internally.  
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) suggest that career concerns are stronger for young 
executives (lifetime earnings at risk are greater), who are further from retirement than older 
executives. Chang et al. (2016) find that younger CEOs receive higher compensation than older 
CEOs when they are hired by a firm with high financial distress risk. This finding is consistent 
with the view that younger CEOs have more concerns about their career prospects and demand 
a higher premium for their human capital risk. Overall, the impact of financial distress risk on 
executive compensation can vary, depending on these executives’ characteristics. To investigate 
the impact of executive characteristics on the relation between financial distress risk and 
executive compensation, we re-estimate our baseline model for each subsample of observations, 
which are grouped as CEO and non-CEO executives, internally and externally hired executives, 
and young and old executives.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 reports the regression results for different subsamples classified according to 
executive characteristics. Panel A of Table 5 presents the estimation results for total 
compensation.  The findings in columns (1) and (2) show that firms with high and medium 
levels of financial distress risk offer both CEOs and non-CEO executives relatively lower levels 
of total compensation. We observe that the coefficient estimates for high financial distress risk 
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are negative and statistically significant for both CEOs and non-CEO executives, except for 
Altman’s distress risk measures, for which the coefficients are statistically insignificant.26 For 
internal and external executives, the subsamples in columns (3) and (4), respectively, our 
findings show that the coefficient estimates for high financial distress risk are negative and 
statistically significant, except for Altman’s distress risk measure. Overall, we observe that both 
internally and externally hired executives receive lower total compensation in firms with high 
distress risk.  
In columns (5) and (6), we test whether the impact of financial distress risk on total 
compensation changes, depending on an executive’s age. We classify our sample of newly hired 
executives into those whose age is above the median (‘old’ executives), and those whose age is 
below the median (‘young’ executives). Our results show that both young and old executives 
receive lower total compensation in firms with high financial distress risk. For Altman’s 
distress risk measure, the coefficient estimates are negative, but statistically insignificant.   
Panel B of Table 5 reports the estimation results for cash-based compensation. Similar to 
the findings in Panel A for total compensation, we observe that the coefficient estimates for 
RISKMed and RISKHigh are negative and statistically significant under the BSM and C&J 
models. Overall, these results show that in the case of newly appointed CEOs and non-CEO 
executives, who are internally or externally appointed, young and old executives at firms with 
high financial distress risk receive lower levels of cash-based compensation than those in firms 
with low financial distress risk. 
                                                          
26 We test whether there are statistically significant differences in the coefficient estimates for financial distress risk 
between CEO and non-CEO subsamples, internal promotions and external hire subsamples, and executive age above 
and below the median subsamples. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that these coefficient estimates are equal.  
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Panel C of Table 5 presents the results of the fraction of equity-based compensation for 
different groups of executives. We observe that financial distress risk has a negative impact on 
the fraction of equity-based compensation for executives across the different subsamples. From 
columns (1) to (6), the coefficient estimates for high financial distress risk are negative and 
statistically significant, except for Altman’s distress risk measure. In contrast to the findings of 
Chang et al. (2016) for US firms, we find a significantly negative relation between financial 
distress risk and the fraction of equity-based compensation in UK firms. Despite the fact that 
both the UK and US share common characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon governance system, they 
seem to differ in how they provide incentives for executives in firms facing high financial 
distress risk. 
 
5.3. The impact of diversification on the compensation contracts of newly hired executives in 
firms with high financial distress risk 
 
Next, we investigate whether diversification influences the relation between financial 
distress risk and executive compensation. Prior studies argue that corporate diversification can 
increase the complexity of the CEO’s job, as resource allocation decisions become more 
complex (e.g., Berry et al., 2006). A CEO at a diversified firm would be required to understand 
several potentially disparate product markets, and therefore needs greater ability (Rose and 
Shepard, 1997). Thus, we can argue that the negative impact of financial distress risk on 
executive compensation would be less pronounced for diversified firms, given that these firms 
will try to attract more talented executives.  
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However, firms with diversification would require more monitoring from creditors when 
they face high financial distress risk, as they are more complex and likely to be subject to 
greater information asymmetry, and in turn, more severe moral hazard problems than non-
diversified firms. We can therefore predict that the negative effect of financial distress risk on 
compensation is stronger for diversified firms. Our results in Table 6 provide evidence 
supporting this view.  In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, we observe that the coefficient 
estimates for RISKMed and RISKHigh (for the BSM and C&J risk measures) are mostly more 
strongly negative for our group of diversified firms than non-diversified firms. Our results show 
that high financial distress risk has a negative and statistically significant impact on executive 
total compensation in groups of both diversified and non-diversified firms; however, this 
negative impact is more pronounced for diversified firms. Further, we find that the coefficient 
estimates for RISKMed and RISKHigh (for the Altman risk measure) are mostly negative and 
statistically insignificant. Columns (3) and (4) show the cash-based estimation results. Similar 
to the results in columns (1) and (2) for total compensation, we observe that the negative impact 
of high financial distress risk on cash-based compensation is mostly stronger in diversified 
firms than non-diversified firms.  
We also find similar results for the fraction of equity-based compensation. Columns (5) 
and (6) report the estimation results for the fraction of equity-based compensation for groups of 
diversified and non-diversified firms. We observe that the coefficient estimates for RISKMed 
and RISKHigh (for the BSM and C&J risk measures) are all negative and statistically 
significant. Further, similar to the findings for executive total compensation in columns (1) and 
(2), the magnitudes of the coefficients are greater for diversified firms than non-diversified 
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firms. Moreover, we find that the difference in the coefficient estimates for RISKMed and 
RISKHigh (for the BSM and C&J risk measures) between diversified and non-diversified firms 
is statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5.4. Proxies for managerial talent  
The existing literature documents that manager heterogeneity, in particular managerial 
talent, accounts for a significant portion of the variation in executive compensation (e.g., 
Fernandes et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). Thus, as part of our robustness tests, we include 
various additional controls that capture managerial talent and labour market competitiveness to 
mitigate the likelihood that our results are driven by potential omitted-variable bias. We 
therefore include Current board positions, College degree, and MBA degree as proxies for 
managerial talent. Table 7 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of the above 
controls.27 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.5. Median Regressions 
In this section, we check the robustness of our main finding of a negative impact of 
financial distress risk on executive compensation using a median regression model. Table 1 
indicates that the mean total compensation is more than twice as large as the median. We 
                                                          
27 Additionally, we focus on our sample of newly hired CEOs and try some alternative CEO-specific variables, i.e., 
Age first CEO position, media hits, past experience as CEO, which have been used by previous researchers as 
proxies for managerial talent (e.g., Falato et al., 2015). Age first CEO position denotes the age at which the 
executive had his/her first job as a CEO; Media hits is the logarithm of the number of articles that contain the CEO’s 
name and company affiliation in UK and international newspapers in the year before the CEO’s appointment, which 
is used only for externally hired CEOs; CEO previous experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the executive 
had a CEO position in the past, and equal to 0 otherwise. Our results remain qualitatively similar when we control 
for these variables. For brevity, we do not tabulate these results. 
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therefore re-estimate the baseline model using a median regression, which is widely used in the 
literature to control for outliers in compensation levels (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Conyon 
and Murphy, 2000). Table 8 presents our results from the median regressions. We observe that 
these results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.6. Matching Estimation 
Even though we focus on the initial compensation packages of newly hired executives, 
there is still the possibility that our results of a negative impact of financial distress risk on 
executive compensation could be driven by a potential endogeneity problem. For instance, our 
sample of firms with high or medium distress risk could be different from those with low 
distress risk in a systematic manner. In other words, there could be some underlying factors 
influencing both initial executive compensation and firms’ financial distress risk. To alleviate 
this concern, we use a propensity score matching estimation as an additional robustness test. 
We compare the compensation variables for firms with high and medium financial distress risk 
with those in matched firms with low distress risk. Specifically, we first estimate the probability 
that a firm is in the high distress risk or medium distress risk group. This probability (i.e., the 
propensity score) is the predicted value from a logit regression using the same controls as those 
included in our baseline model.  
We then construct a treatment and control group of observations using the one-to-one 
nearest-neighbour matching method with replacement based on the estimated propensity scores. 
That is, each firm-year observation with high or medium distress risk (the treatment group) is 
matched with a firm-year observation with low distress risk (the control group) using the closest 
 34 
 
propensity score. Overall, as Table 9 demonstrates, our results from the propensity score 
matching estimation confirm the findings from pooled OLS estimation.28 The negative and 
statistically significant values of average treatment effects (ATEs) and the average treatment 
effects on the treated (ATETs) show that newly hired executives at firms with high (and 
medium) financial distress risk receive lower total compensation, cash-based compensation and 
fraction of equity-based compensation than those at firms with low financial distress risk. 
As an alternative to this estimation method, we also consider a one-to-one covariate 
matching method with replacement and rely on the bias-corrected nearest-neighbour matching 
estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (2011). Our results are qualitatively similar when 
we use this alternative estimation method (see Table A2).  
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
5.7.  Further robustness test 
         Forced executive turnovers can have a positive impact on compensation, as executives 
would demand a risk premium for the potential risk of dismissal (Peters and Wagner, 2014). In 
untabulated tests, we control for forced turnovers in our baseline regression model. Thus, we 
check whether the executive appointed is replacing an incumbent who has been fired. For this 
analysis, we restrict our sample to CEOs and CFOs, and include a dummy for forced turnovers, 
Forced Turnover, which is equal to 1 for those CEOs and CFOs who are under 60 and did not 
take another comparable position within one year of their departure.29 Our finding that financial 
                                                          
28 In Panel A of Table 9, we drop some observations because they violate the overlap assumption of the propensity 
score matching estimator, which states that each firm-year should have a positive probability of being subject to 
each treatment level.  
29 Further, we checked some media reports from Factiva to see whether we could distinguish ‘forced’ versus 
‘voluntary’ turnovers. However, as prior researchers mention, it is difficult to differentiate clearly between them 
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distress risk has a negative and statistically significant impact on CEO/ CFO compensation 
remains robust. We also observe that the coefficient estimate on Forced Turnover is positive, 
but statistically insignificant in total compensation and fraction of equity-based compensation 
regressions. This evidence mitigates concerns that Forced Turnover is a significant omitted 
variable in our model.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationship between financial distress risk and the initial 
executive compensation contracts in UK firms. One distinctive characteristic of the UK setting 
is that it has highly concentrated debt markets, which can have implications in terms of the 
monitoring that creditors can provide for firms with high financial distress risk. Creditors in the 
UK can play an active role and can come up with a business plan to execute in rescuing firms 
under high financial distress risk (McCormack, 2007). The main objective is to rescue the firm 
in a way that best serves the interests of creditors. Thus, executives at firms with high financial 
distress risk are expected to play a relatively limited strategic role in comparison to those in US 
firms. It is conceivable that the role of executives is reduced to that of a bureaucrat with low 
managerial discretion, responsible for executing the business plan put together by creditors 
(Armour et al., 2002). As Palia (2000) argues, lower managerial discretion reduces returns to 
managerial skill, and leads to lower compensation. 
Employing a sample of 3,614 newly hired executives from 1,117 UK listed non-financial 
firms, we examine how financial distress risk influences the level and structure of the initial 
                                                          
based on media reports (e.g., Jenter and Lewellen, 2017). We thank the referee for suggesting this alternative 
definition of forced turnover. 
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compensation of newly hired executives. We find that newly hired executives in firms with high 
financial distress risk receive lower levels of total compensation and cash-based compensation. 
This negative impact of financial distress risk is more pronounced in firms with high bank debt.  
Our results are consistent with increased monitoring by creditors as financial distress risk 
increases, putting downward pressure on the level of executive pay. Further, our results show 
that financial distress risk has a negative and statistically significant impact on the fraction of 
equity-based compensation. This finding provides support for the view that concentrated credit 
markets in the UK allow creditors to provide monitoring and reduce risk- shifting incentives 
when firms face high financial distress risk.  
Overall, our findings of a negative relation between financial distress risk and executive 
total compensation for UK firms complement the findings of a positive relation documented by 
existing US-based studies. The contrasting findings point to the possibility that the effect of 
financial distress risk on executive compensation depends on the institutional environment in 
which firms operate. In the UK, where debt markets are more concentrated, the effect of bank 
monitoring on executive compensation seems to be stronger than the effect of human capital 
risk. Executives at firms with high financial distress risk receive relatively lower compensation, 
as creditors play an active monitoring role. In the US, however, where debt markets are 
dispersed, the effect of human capital risk seems to dominate, as newly hired executives at 
firms with high financial distress risk receive larger compensation than those at firms with low 
financial distress risk. Given that debt markets are mostly concentrated around the world, our 
results of the negative relationship between executive compensation and financial distress risk 
can be generalized to those countries where creditors would be expected to take an active 
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monitoring role at firms with high financial distress risk. Future research could further our 
understanding of how concentrated credit markets influence the matching between executives 
and firms in a competitive assignment framework, considering the potential conflicts of interest 
between different debt holders and equity holders, and the implications of a matching 
equilibrium for executive compensation in firms with high financial distress risk. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Definitions of variables. 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Definition 
 
BSM  
 
Probability of default based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM 
model. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
C&J  Probability of bankruptcy based on Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s 
hazard model. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Altman  Probability of bankruptcy based on Altman (1968)’s z-score 
model. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
RISKMed Dummy variable that equals one for firms with medium levels 
of estimated distress risk using various models, and zero 
otherwise. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
RISKHigh Dummy variable that equals one for firms with high levels of 
estimated distress risk using various models, and zero 
otherwise. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Salary 
 
Annual executive salary. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Bonus Annual executive bonuses. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Cash-based Compensation 
 
 
Sum of salary and bonus. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Equity-based Compensation 
 
Value of stock awards, long-term incentive plans and Black-
Scholes value of options granted during the year. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Total Compensation 
 
Sum of cash- and equity-based compensation. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Equity-based /Total Compensation Ratio of equity-based compensation to total compensation. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Delta 
 
 
GB pound change in the CEO’s (or non-CEO executive’s) total 
wealth for a 1% change in the stock price.  
(Source: Boardex and Worldscope-Datastream). 
 
Deltas and vegas are calculated following the method of Core 
and Guay (2002) and using the Black–Scholes model. Boardex 
collects the details of executives’ holdings of equity-based 
incentives from company annual reports.  As Ozkan (2011) 
explains, UK annual reports provide information on the grant 
date, exercise price, vesting period for the stock option 
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holdings, stock awards and LTIP (Long-term incentive plans), 
which are available in the Boardex database. We obtain the 
risk-free rate, the stock return volatility and the dividend yield 
from Worlscope-Datastream. The time-to-exercise is assumed 
to be equal to the time-to-maturity of the option. In the rare 
cases when this variable is not available, it is assumed to be five 
years. The risk-free rate is the rate on government bonds with a 
time-to-maturity that matches the time-to-maturity of the option 
(source: Worldscope-Datastream). The annualized stock return 
volatility is computed using monthly returns over the previous 
five years (source: Worldscope-Datastream). At least 12 
monthly returns must be non-missing to compute this variable. 
The dividend yield is based on the average value of the 
dividends/market value over the past three years. At least one 
observation of this variable must be non-missing to calculate 
the dividend yield. 
 
  
Vega 
 
GB pound change in the CEO’s (or non-CEO executive’s) 
option portfolio value for a 0.01 change in stock return 
volatility.  
(Source: Boardex and Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Sales  Sales adjusted for inflation. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Leverage  
 
The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Tobin’s Q  Ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets to the book value of 
its assets. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
ROA  Ratio of net income before extraordinary items plus interest 
expenses to the book value of total assets. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Cash Holding   The ratio of cash and short-term investments to the book value 
of total assets. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Stock Return  
 
Stock return over a one-year period. 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Stock Volatility 
 
Standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the past two 
fiscal years (excluding the current year). 
(Source: Worldscope-Datastream) 
 
Bank Debt Ratio of bank debt, which is the sum of term loans and 
revolving credit, to total debt. 
(Source: Capital IQ) 
 
 
 
Independent Directors 
 
Ratio of the number of independent directors to the total 
number of board members.  
(Source: Boardex) 
 
3% or above /Total Institutional Ownership Share holdings of institutional investors who own 3% or more 
of the firm’s equity divided by total institutional share holdings.  
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
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CEO dummy Dummy that equals one for new CEOs, and zero otherwise.  
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Age Age of the new executive at the time of appointment. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
External Hire dummy Dummy that equals one if the new executive is hired from 
outside the company, and zero otherwise. 
(Source: Boardex) 
 
Current Board Positions Number of current board positions of the executive, including 
the sample firm. 
(Source: BoardEx) 
 
College Degree dummy Dummy that equals one if the executive has a bachelor’s degree 
or higher, and zero otherwise.  
(Source: BoardEx) 
 
MBA Degree dummy Dummy that equals one if executive has an MBA degree, and 
zero otherwise.  
(Source: Boardex) 
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Table A2 
 Bias-corrected nearest-neighbour matching estimator. 
This table reports the bias-corrected nearest-neighbour matching estimation results. Panels A, B, and C report the nearest-
neighbour matching estimates based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model, and 
Altman (1968)’s z-score model, respectively. The outcome variables include: the logarithm of salary, Ln(Salary), logarithm of 
bonuses, Ln(Bonus+1), logarithm of cash-based pay, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), logarithm of equity-based pay, Ln(Equity-
based Compensation+1), logarithm of total compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), fraction of equity-based compensation, 
Equity-based/Total Compensation, executive performance incentives, Ln(Delta+1), and risk-taking incentives, Ln(Vega+1). 
Both the average treatment effects (ATEs) and the average treatment effects on the treated (ATETs) are reported together with 
their respective p-values. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 No. of observations ATE p-value ATET p-value 
Panel A. High and medium distress risk vs. low distress risk using the BSM model 
  
Ln(Salary) 3,614 -0.160*** 0.000 -0.108*** 0.000 
Ln(Bonuses+1) 3,614 0.827*** 0.004 -0.472 0.206 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 3,614 -0.157*** 0.000 -0.140*** 0.000 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1) 3,614 -1.032*** 0.002 -2.481*** 0.000 
Ln(Total Compensation) 3,614 -0.316*** 0.000 -0.490*** 0.000 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 3,614 -0.086*** 0.000 -0.146*** 0.000 
Ln(Delta+1) 3,614 -1.019*** 0.000 -1.467*** 0.000 
Ln(Vega+1) 3,614 -1.243*** 0.000 -1.528*** 0.000 
 
Panel B. High and medium distress risk vs. low distress risk using the C&J model 
  
Ln(Salary) 3,614 -0.054** 0.028 -0.050** 0.046 
Ln(Bonuses+1) 3,614 -0.043 0.874 -0.937*** 0.003 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 3,614 -0.057** 0.045 -0.093*** 0.005 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1) 3,614 -0.685** 0.037 -1.134*** 0.001 
Ln(Total Compensation) 3,614 -0.115*** 0.003 -0.153*** 0.001 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 3,614 -0.032** 0.016 -0.040*** 0.001 
Ln(Delta+1) 3,614 -0.348*** 0.007 -0.725*** 0.000 
Ln(Vega+1) 3,614 -0.445* 0.050 -0.459** 0.028 
 
Panel C. High and medium distress risk vs. low distress risk using the Altman model 
  
Ln(Salary) 3,614 0.061** 0.016 -0.020 0.449 
Ln(Bonuses+1) 3,614 -0.854** 0.011 -0.816*** 0.009 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 3,614 0.039 0.191 -0.053 0.105 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1) 3,614 1.132*** 0.000 -0.400 0.251 
Ln(Total Compensation) 3,614 0.061 0.117 -0.093* 0.050 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 3,614 0.023* 0.068 -0.018 0.205 
Ln(Delta+1) 3,614 -0.561*** 0.000 -0.786*** 0.000 
Ln(Vega+1) 3,614 -0.018 0.935 -0.522** 0.013 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in this study. Our sample consists of 3,614 new executive 
appointments from 1,117 UK listed non-financial companies. All variables are defined in Table A1. 
   
No. of 
observations 
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
 
Financial Distress Risk Measures 
  
BSM   3,614 0.012 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.289 
C&J   3,614 0.005 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.095 
Altman   3,614 0.158 0.063 0.242 0.000 1.000 
 
Executive Compensation 
  
Salary (£000) 3,614 208.304 162.455 143.361 43.935 770.140 
Bonus (£000) 3,614 87.551 28.460 149.953 0.000 873.239 
Cash-based Compensation (£000) 3,614 295.735 204.352 267.118 47.170 1,470.968 
Equity-based Compensation (£000) 3,614 227.362 36.019 506.578 0.000 3,362.000 
Total Compensation (£000) 3,614 526.121 267.281 717.812 49.853 4,444.898 
Equity-based/Total Compensation 3,614 0.229 0.171 0.243 0.000 0.842 
Delta (£000) 3,614 19.333 4.864 43.834 0.000 293.292 
Vega (£000) 3,614 3.055 0.640 6.541 0.000 42.123 
 
Firm-Specific Variables 
  
Sales (£m) 3,614 1,227.385 95.277 3,279.338 0.000 21,411.950 
Leverage  3,614 0.180 0.143 0.178 0.000 0.829 
ROA  3,614 -0.036 0.042 0.255 -1.366 0.259 
Tobin’s Q  3,614 2.104 1.516 1.769 0.601 11.399 
Cash Holding 3,614 0.185 0.100 0.218 0.000 0.932 
Stock Return 3,614 0.062 0.026 0.514 -0.876 1.967 
Stock Volatility 3,614 0.433 0.374 0.236 0.122 1.337 
Bank Debt 2,622 0.669 0.919 0.401 0.000 1.000 
       
Governance Variables 
Independent Directors 3,614 0.371 0.400 0.191 0.000 0.929 
3% or above/Total Institutional Ownership 3,614 0.547 0.592 0.263 0.000 0.987 
 
Executive-Specific Characteristics 
  
CEO dummy  3,614 0.293 0.000 0.455 0.000 1.000 
Age  3,614 47.617 47.000 7.544 26.000 79.000 
External Hire dummy  3,614 0.460 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Current Board Positions  2,423 1.235 1.000 0.618 1.000 7.000 
College Degree dummy  2,423 0.789 1.000 0.408 0.000 1.000 
MBA Degree dummy  2,423 0.136 0.000 0.343 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics for compensation variables by decile of financial distress risk. 
This table presents the means (medians) of the executive compensation variables by decile for the three distress risk measures (probability of default/bankruptcy) employed. The 
compensation variables include salary, bonus, cash-based compensation, equity-based compensation, total compensation, fraction of equity-based compensation, delta and vega. 
The results in each panel are based on different models for determining the probability of default/bankruptcy. Panel A is based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model; Panel B is 
based on Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model; and Panel C is based on Altman (1968)’s z-score model.  
 
Panel A: BSM by decile 
 
 
Decile No. of  
observations 
BSM  
 
Salary  
 
Bonus 
 
Cash-based  
Compensation 
Equity-based  
Compensation  
Total Compensation  
 
Equity-based  
/Total Compensation 
Delta 
 
Vega 
 
1 362 0.000 179.508 71.128 250.825 201.627 453.133 0.218 27.194 2.834 
  (0.000) (144.613) (24.958) (185.503) (9.376) (229.858) (0.074) (7.826) (0.869) 
2 363 0.000 207.978 102.176 310.195 327.683 637.605 0.297 25.935 4.053 
  (0.000) (160.313) (55.843) (224.490) (91.887) (341.826) (0.291) (8.126) (1.140) 
3 360 0.000 219.607 115.091 334.868 285.593 632.732 0.265 28.082 3.232 
  (0.000) (169.082) (62.987) (243.201) (76.763) (357.715) (0.275) (8.121) (1.039) 
4 361 0.000 221.810 110.087 331.464 268.333 600.663 0.241 22.914 3.550 
  (0.000) (173.469) (45.113) (230.361) (51.363) (301.866) (0.208) (5.894) (0.766) 
5 362 0.000 204.638 96.963 300.890 235.244 536.953 0.241 19.705 3.436 
  (0.000) (166.573) (39.297) (218.853) (41.837) (261.370) (0.185) (6.080) (0.848) 
6 361 0.000 237.021 112.448 350.378 275.633 620.376 0.267 18.640 4.448 
  (0.000) (192.571) (43.433) (247.959) (82.949) (353.503) (0.258) (6.401) (1.368) 
7 361 0.000 217.375 85.171 301.958 196.566 502.539 0.214 14.320 3.054 
  (0.000) (169.110) (25.415) (205.279) (32.909) (259.928) (0.134) (4.369) (0.668) 
8 362 0.001 217.980 83.095 299.746 224.020 535.179 0.214 19.578 2.695 
  (0.001) (169.851) (12.579) (198.556) (31.923) (263.186) (0.145) (4.152) (0.383) 
9 361 0.009 192.253 60.315 251.952 168.067 425.567 0.185 9.492 2.349 
  (0.008) (150.000) (2.123) (178.606) (7.373) (210.289) (0.065) (2.422) (0.230) 
10 361 0.109 184.962 39.061 225.199 90.518 316.287 0.149 7.432 0.894 
  (0.077) (145.812) (0.000) (156.682) (0.922) (177.282) (0.007) (1.101) (0.115) 
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Panel B:  C&J by decile 
 
Decile No. of  
observations 
C&J  Salary  
 
Bonus 
 
Cash-based 
Compensation 
Equity-based  
Compensation  
Total Compensation  
 
Equity-based  
/Total Compensation 
Delta 
 
Vega 
 
1 363 0.001 220.213 106.690 327.624 433.778 770.110 0.285 39.235 5.509 
  (0.001) (151.992) (28.000) (204.301) (55.202) (302.999) (0.250) (11.380) (1.168) 
2 362 0.001 195.557 95.198 292.129 244.950 543.652 0.245 25.139 3.254 
  (0.001) (157.831) (36.918) (203.705) (51.904) (271.258) (0.224) (5.971) (0.878) 
3 360 0.001 221.869 104.995 325.531 243.615 575.669 0.246 18.875 3.478 
  (0.001) (172.214) (40.61) (213.894) (47.564) (302.009) (0.197) (6.497) (1.402) 
4 362 0.002 225.319 99.102 324.550 234.655 558.127 0.257 23.014 3.539 
  (0.002) (185.666) (47.980) (240.942) (76.288) (332.366) (0.252) (6.244) (1.051) 
5 360 0.002 219.475 99.875 318.087 298.315 615.554 0.273 17.720 3.451 
  (0.002) (167.357) (41.272) (220.105) (69.678) (316.038) (0.236) (5.544) (0.901) 
6 362 0.002 214.239 92.798 305.595 194.665 504.424 0.223 18.268 2.633 
  (0.002) (166.550) (40.614) (223.373) (42.164) (281.720) (0.207) (4.754) (0.833) 
7 362 0.003 207.325 84.004 290.834 195.629 486.991 0.213 16.467 2.686 
  (0.003) (169.759) (35.866) (207.518) (39.916) (252.283) (0.160) (3.892) (0.756) 
8 361 0.004 207.226 85.563 291.014 167.278 464.406 0.203 14.591 2.366 
  (0.003) (163.265) (20.964) (203.324) (30.564) (264.565) (0.168) (4.166) (0.462) 
9 362 0.005 197.191 66.317 266.095 161.479 427.107 0.195 11.028 2.345 
  (0.005) (156.075) (12.659) (193.224) (10.138) (239.979) (0.083) (3.434) (0.296) 
10 360 0.026 174.538 40.814 215.633 98.292 313.92 0.151 8.855 1.276 
  (0.012) (138.249) (0.000) (151.968) (0.000) (170.046) (0.000) (1.477) (0.087) 
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Panel C: Altman by decile 
 
Decile No. of 
observations 
Altman  Salary  
 
Bonus 
 
Cash-based  
Compensation 
Equity-based  
Compensation  
Total Compensation  
 
Equity-based  
/Total Compensation 
Delta 
 
Vega 
 
1 362 0.000 151.424 59.426 210.342 202.855 420.815 0.220 30.176 2.776 
  (0.000) (117.302) (9.888) (141.486) (0.000) (178.264) (0.000) (7.624) (0.803) 
2 361 0.003 173.350 62.631 235.987 163.000 400.873 0.204 25.457 2.581 
  (0.003) (146.628) (22.449) (186.246) (9.775) (225.367) (0.052) (6.677) (1.052) 
3 362 0.013 207.090 91.748 297.879 225.981 521.800 0.221 30.691 2.629 
  (0.013) (161.255) (43.608) (209.793) (37.327) (269.710) (0.162) (8.297) (0.354) 
4 361 0.029 230.981 120.711 351.032 294.369 644.249 0.246 26.524 3.892 
  (0.028) (188.211) (51.000) (243.187) (64.516) (328.679) (0.240) (6.962) (1.014) 
5 361 0.051 225.223 112.790 336.867 274.312 611.074 0.257 20.108 3.921 
  (0.051) (178.700) (45.648) (239.917) (73.040) (327.551) (0.245) (4.945) (0.883) 
6 362 0.079 227.732 93.961 323.162 229.043 560.864 0.246 14.764 3.097 
  (0.077) (189.036) (41.063) (235.003) (77.466) (317.207) (0.233) (4.673) (0.816) 
7 362 0.123 234.732 97.661 332.814 291.720 629.000 0.263 14.240 3.632 
  (0.122) (196.100) (44.007) (253.188) (65.479) (331.589) (0.240) (5.789) (1.050) 
8 361 0.180 244.166 115.464 359.550 255.545 617.276 0.249 13.107 3.526 
  (0.178) (191.705) (46.931) (244.000) (67.347) (363.134) (0.229) (4.469) (0.722) 
9 361 0.301 228.296 83.322 311.580 221.905 543.071 0.235 12.603 3.185 
  (0.295) (178.904) (15.924) (230.415) (37.000) (302.304) (0.175) (2.985) (0.406) 
10 361 0.800 160.075 37.815 198.186 114.782 312.110 0.151 5.624 1.311 
  (0.892) (127.000) (0.000) (135.000) (0.000) (151.862) (0.000) (0.997) (0.141) 
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Table 3 
Baseline regressions of executive compensation on financial distress risk, firm, executive, and governance characteristics. 
This table examines the relation between various measures of executive compensation and financial distress risk. Dependent variables are the logarithm of salary, Ln(Salary), 
logarithm of bonuses, Ln(Bonus+1), and logarithm of cash-based compensation, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), for Panel A; the logarithm of equity-based compensation, 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1), logarithm of total compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), and fraction of equity-based compensation, Equity-based /Total Compensation, 
for Panel B; measure of executive performance incentives, Ln(Delta+1), and risk-taking incentives, Ln(Vega+1), for Panel C. We use OLS regressions to estimate salary, cash-
based compensation, and total compensation and Tobit regressions for bonus, equity-based compensation, fraction of equity-based compensation, delta, and vega. The 
independent variables of main interest are RISKMed and RISKHigh, which are dummy variables equal to one for firms with medium and high levels of financial distress risk, 
respectively. The three financial distress risk measures are computed using Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model, and Altman (1968)’s 
z-score model, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. t -Statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include industry dummies that are based on the 12 Fama-French 
industries, and year dummies. 
 Panel A: Components of executive compensation and financial distress risk    
 Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Salary) 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Bonus+1) 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 
 BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
RISKMed -0.094*** -0.084*** -0.024 -1.403** -0.900 -1.989*** -0.142*** -0.111*** -0.0754 
 (-2.586) (-2.776) (-0.616) (-2.120) (-1.503) (-2.803) (-3.143) (-2.918) (-1.540) 
RISKHigh -0.101** -0.154*** -0.007 -1.730* -2.324*** -0.745 -0.147** -0.214*** -0.0212 
 (-2.038) (-4.023) (-0.193) (-1.849) (-3.132) (-1.024) (-2.472) (-4.627) (-0.450) 
Ln(Sales)  0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.583*** 0.575*** 0.553*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 
 (11.850) (12.100) (11.810) (6.413) (6.375) (6.098) (11.400) (11.590) (11.270) 
Leverage  0.319*** 0.368*** 0.304*** 3.390*** 4.102*** 3.887*** 0.435*** 0.500*** 0.429*** 
 (4.536) (5.233) (4.268) (3.114) (3.551) (3.502) (4.965) (5.624) (4.877) 
ROA 0.082** 0.064 0.078* 1.598* 1.357 1.217 0.161*** 0.136*** 0.149*** 
 (1.986) (1.531) (1.773) (1.716) (1.460) (1.275) (3.159) (2.643) (2.730) 
Tobin’s Q -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 0.086 0.138 0.0761 0.001 0.005 0.003 
 (-1.121) (-0.668) (-0.793) (0.748) (1.232) (0.675) (0.082) (0.628) (0.364) 
Cash Holding 0.243*** 0.254*** 0.255*** 3.956*** 4.184*** 4.155*** 0.318*** 0.335*** 0.336*** 
 (3.585) (3.841) (3.840) (3.333) (3.562) (3.530) (3.698) (3.983) (3.972) 
Stock Return -0.024 -0.034* -0.013 2.338*** 2.230*** 2.426*** 0.069*** 0.057** 0.084*** 
 (-1.202) (-1.690) (-0.661) (6.082) (5.769) (6.472) (2.641) (2.185) (3.209) 
Stock Volatility 0.044 0.004 -0.064 -6.257*** -7.133*** -7.726*** -0.050 -0.115* -0.202*** 
 (0.594) (0.086) (-1.244) (-4.311) (-6.266) (-6.952) (-0.538) (-1.785) (-3.155) 
Independent 
Directors  0.829*** 0.812*** 0.834*** 5.794*** 5.582*** 5.807*** 
          
1.005*** 
         
0.982*** 1.010*** 
 (12.140) (11.860) (12.220) (5.076) (4.871) (5.074) (11.740) (11.440) (11.820) 
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3% or above /Total 
Institutional 
Ownership -0.321*** -0.322*** -0.326*** -1.340* -1.361* -1.456* -0.421*** -0.423*** -0.429*** 
 (-6.286) (-6.391) (-6.360) (-1.738) (-1.775) (-1.899) (-6.367) (-6.492) (-6.460) 
CEO dummy 0.356*** 0.361*** 0.357*** 0.534** 0.601** 0.557** 0.380*** 0.388*** 0.382*** 
 (25.830) (26.110) (25.850) (2.235) (2.514) (2.332) (22.040) (22.420) (22.110) 
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.059*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (6.955) (6.910) (7.016) (-3.074) (-3.148) (-3.087) (5.159) (5.077) (5.216) 
External Hire 
dummy 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.215 0.224 0.171 
                
0.005 
               
0.007 
               
0.002 
 (0.402) (0.504) (0.312) (0.733) (0.763) (0.581) (0.218) (0.315) (0.104) 
Intercept  10.480*** 10.490*** 10.550*** -4.408* -3.834 -3.299 10.350*** 10.380*** 10.480*** 
 (63.030) (64.630) (63.790) (-1.661) (-1.458) (-1.253) (49.140) (50.080) (50.300) 
No. of observations 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.536 0.531 − − − 0.518 0.521 0.516 
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Panel B: Equity-based compensation, total compensation and financial distress risk 
 Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Total Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 
 BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
RISKMed -1.663** -1.539** -0.766 -0.234*** -0.169*** -0.081 -0.085*** -0.062** -0.013 
 (-2.223) (-2.259) (-1.021) (-3.686) (-3.171) (-1.166) (-2.913) (-2.287) (-0.440) 
RISKHigh -3.428*** -3.114*** -0.935 -0.303*** -0.323*** -0.078 -0.154*** -0.124*** -0.054* 
 (-3.388) (-3.799) (-1.156) (-3.693) (-4.968) (-1.202) (-3.965) (-3.797) (-1.668) 
Ln(Sales)  0.438*** 0.421*** 0.398*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (4.664) (4.550) (4.268) (9.909) (9.988) (9.627) (3.894) (3.729) (3.493) 
Leverage  4.642*** 5.479*** 4.455*** 0.611*** 0.698*** 0.587*** 0.181*** 0.210*** 0.166*** 
 (3.815) (4.292) (3.579) (4.975) (5.598) (4.733) (3.609) (4.029) (3.199) 
ROA 0.0574 -0.360 -0.421 0.150** 0.111 0.113 0.000 -0.017 -0.025 
 (0.063) (-0.402) (-0.441) (1.969) (1.439) (1.424) (-0.002) (-0.451) (-0.646) 
Tobin’s Q 0.145 0.215 0.183 0.015 0.023* 0.020 0.011* 0.015** 0.014** 
 (1.041) (1.574) (1.314) (1.162) (1.791) (1.537) (1.853) (2.421) (2.216) 
Cash Holding 0.165 0.530 0.519 0.332*** 0.366*** 0.366*** -0.006 0.010 0.010 
 (0.119) (0.384) (0.375) (2.890) (3.241) (3.221) (-0.111) (0.185) (0.173) 
Stock Return 1.014** 0.932** 1.268*** 0.155*** 0.144*** 0.182*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.078*** 
 (2.339) (2.156) (2.958) (3.977) (3.704) (4.688) (3.591) (3.559) (4.260) 
Stock Volatility 2.378 0.369 -0.663 0.082 -0.092 -0.210** 0.115* 0.016 -0.021 
 (1.566) (0.331) (-0.598) (0.616) (-0.998) (-2.261) (1.841) (0.345) (-0.459) 
Independent Directors 11.100*** 10.800*** 11.190*** 1.419*** 1.388*** 1.428*** 0.457*** 0.446*** 0.461*** 
 (8.800) (8.507) (8.905) (12.230) (11.910) (12.280) (8.873) (8.592) (8.942) 
3% or above /Total Institutional Ownership -0.667 -0.775 -0.882 -0.507*** -0.515*** -0.522*** -0.050 -0.055 -0.059 
 (-0.727) (-0.844) (-0.962) (-5.685) (-5.834) (-5.794) (-1.351) (-1.500) (-1.600) 
CEO dummy -0.671** -0.579** -0.666** 0.378*** 0.389*** 0.380*** -0.023** -0.020* -0.023* 
 (-2.283) (-1.974) (-2.258) (15.910) (16.300) (15.920) (-1.976) (-1.653) (-1.944) 
Age -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.094*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.174) (-4.220) (-4.085) (2.498) (2.421) (2.540) (-4.060) (-4.103) (-3.968) 
External Hire dummy 0.132 0.147 0.071 0.016 0.018 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.010 
 (0.393) (0.437) (0.211) (0.536) (0.613) (0.337) (0.958) (0.986) (0.732) 
Intercept  -3.745 -2.553 -2.137 10.310*** 10.390*** 10.520*** -0.222* -0.167 -0.152 
 (-1.232) (-0.855) (-0.704) (36.630) (37.700) (37.590) (-1.751) (-1.338) (-1.205) 
No. of observations 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 
Adjusted R2 − − − 0.455 0.458 0.451 − − − 
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Panel C: Delta, vega and financial distress risk 
 Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Delta+1) 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Vega+1) 
 BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
RISKMed -0.328* -0.429*** -0.598*** -0.874** -0.237 0.079 
 (-1.839) (-2.648) (-3.075) (-2.516) (-0.765) (0.222) 
RISKHigh -1.080*** -0.875*** -1.196*** -1.954*** -1.407*** -0.840** 
 (-4.221) (-3.936) (-5.673) (-4.179) (-3.620) (-2.238) 
Ln(Sales)  0.087*** 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.049 0.035 0.029 
 (4.511) (4.376) (4.037) (1.322) (0.968) (0.782) 
Leverage  0.131 0.376 0.397 0.681 0.939 0.466 
 (0.405) (1.098) (1.174) (0.997) (1.362) (0.670) 
ROA 0.955*** 0.833*** 0.429* 0.221 0.032 -0.147 
 (4.314) (3.700) (1.814) (0.524) (0.075) (-0.327) 
Tobin’s Q 0.179*** 0.198*** 0.170*** 0.009 0.051 0.039 
 (4.932) (5.608) (4.687) (0.142) (0.786) (0.584) 
Cash Holding 1.108*** 1.225*** 1.196*** 0.648 0.888 0.856 
 (3.704) (4.122) (4.009) (1.089) (1.488) (1.436) 
Stock Return 0.637*** 0.614*** 0.638*** 0.066 0.093 0.203 
 (6.217) (6.092) (6.438) (0.340) (0.475) (1.056) 
Stock Volatility -0.633* -1.253*** -1.177*** 0.561 -0.754 -1.082** 
 (-1.739) (-4.453) (-4.279) (0.825) (-1.419) (-2.120) 
Independent Directors 2.040*** 1.961*** 2.002*** 2.365*** 2.259*** 2.393*** 
 (6.492) (6.165) (6.377) (3.730) (3.523) (3.731) 
3% or above /Total Institutional Ownership -0.674*** -0.715*** -0.715*** -0.031 -0.144 -0.127 
 (-2.860) (-3.056) (-3.064) (-0.075) (-0.344) (-0.301) 
CEO dummy 0.881*** 0.903*** 0.884*** 0.207 0.242 0.210 
 (10.940) (11.220) (11.050) (1.390) (1.615) (1.394) 
Age 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** -0.027** -0.027** -0.026** 
 (4.214) (4.207) (4.160) (-2.251) (-2.222) (-2.183) 
External Hire dummy -0.170* -0.167* -0.212** -0.347* -0.357** -0.391** 
 (-1.847) (-1.822) (-2.298) (-1.951) (-2.022) (-2.194) 
Intercept  4.411*** 4.750*** 4.970*** 3.626** 4.291*** 4.481*** 
 (6.523) (7.250) (7.447) (2.461) (2.968) (3.074) 
No. of observations 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 
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Table 4  
Regressions of executive compensation on financial distress risk, firm, executive, and governance characteristics for 
low bank debt and high bank debt firms.  
This table examines the relation between various measures of executive compensation and financial distress risk for low bank debt firms 
and high bank debt firms, respectively. Dependent variables are the logarithm of total compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), logarithm 
of cash-based compensation, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), and fraction of equity-based compensation, Equity-based/Total 
Compensation. We use OLS regressions to estimate total compensation and cash-based compensation, and Tobit regressions for the 
fraction of equity-based compensation. RISKMed and RISKHigh are dummy variables equal to one for firms with medium and high 
levels of distress risk, respectively. The three financial distress risk indicators are based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava 
and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model and Altman (1968)’s z-score model. The high bank debt group includes firms with both the ratio of 
bank debt to total debt and leverage above the sample median, while the low bank debt group consists of firms that have both the ratio 
of bank debt to total debt and leverage below the median. For brevity, we report only the coefficients for the financial distress risk 
variables. The same set of controls as in Table 3 is included. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. t -Statistics 
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. All regressions include industry dummies that are based on the 12 Fama-French industries, and year dummies.  
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Total Compensation) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 
 
Low bank  
debt 
(1) 
High bank  
debt 
(2) 
 
Low bank  
debt 
(3) 
High bank  
debt 
(4) 
 
Low bank  
debt 
(5) 
High bank  
debt 
(6) 
         
RISKMed (BSM) -0.137 -0.328***  -0.054 -0.289***  -0.137 -0.038 
 (-0.932) (-3.406)  (-0.524) (-4.196)  (-1.417) (-0.814) 
RISKHigh (BSM) 0.034 -0.452***  0.056 -0.324***  -0.109 -0.137** 
 (0.155) (-3.285)  (0.372) (-2.961)  (-0.725) (-2.253) 
No. of observations 656 760  656 760  656 760 
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.525  0.383 0.556  − − 
         
RISKMed (C&J) -0.173 -0.142*  -0.069 -0.123**  -0.200* -0.031 
 (-1.190) (-1.692)  (-0.649) (-1.980)  (-1.920) (-0.825) 
RISKHigh (C&J) -0.103 -0.347***  -0.071 -0.256***  -0.087 -0.066 
 (-0.832) (-3.366)  (-0.882) (-3.429)  (-0.907) (-1.327) 
No. of observations 656 760  656 760  656 760 
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.522  0.383 0.552  − − 
         
RISKMed (Altman) 0.162 -0.080  0.094 -0.052  0.096 -0.028 
 (0.773) (-0.897)  (0.659) (-0.758)  (0.939) (-0.572) 
RISKHigh (Altman) -0.040 -0.053  0.029 0.016  -0.059 -0.077 
 (-0.357) (-0.402)  (0.351) (0.177)  (-0.792) (-1.089) 
No. of observations 656 760  656 760  656 760 
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.512  0.383 0.542  − − 
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Table 5 
Regressions of executive compensation for different subsamples based on executive characteristics. 
This table examines the relation between various measures of executive compensation and financial distress risk for different subsamples 
based on executive characteristics. Dependent variables are the logarithm of total compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), logarithm of 
cash-based compensation, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), and fraction of equity-based compensation, Equity-based/Total 
Compensation. Panels A and B present the results of OLS regressions of ln (Total Compensation) and ln (Cash-based Compensation), 
respectively, and Panel C presents the results of Tobit regressions of Equity-based /Total Compensation. RISKMed and RISKHigh are 
dummy variables equal to one for firms with medium and high levels of distress risk, respectively. The three financial distress risk 
indicators are based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model and Altman (1968)’s z-score 
model. For brevity, we report only the coefficients for the financial distress risk variables. The same set of controls as in Table 3 is 
included. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. t-Statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include industry dummies 
that are based on the 12 Fama-French industries, and year dummies.  
 
CEOs 
only 
 
Non-CEO 
executives 
only 
 
Internal 
promotions 
External 
hires 
 
Executive age 
above median 
Executive age 
below median 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Ln(Total Compensation) 
 
RISKMed (BSM) -0.227** -0.233***  -0.311*** -0.151*  -0.245*** -0.233*** 
 (-2.491) (-3.537)  (-3.744) (-1.945)  (-2.969) (-3.010) 
RISKHigh (BSM) -0.349*** -0.275***  -0.331*** -0.263**  -0.336*** -0.291*** 
 (-3.116) (-3.177)  (-3.264) (-2.484)  (-3.221) (-3.056) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
Adjusted R2 0.440 0.457  0.495 0.433  0.480 0.433 
         
RISKMed (C&J) -0.169** -0.167***  -0.244*** -0.082  -0.198*** -0.167*** 
 (-2.073) (-2.882)  (-3.658) (-1.207)  (-2.632) (-2.794) 
RISKHigh (C&J) -0.328*** -0.308***  -0.335*** -0.293***  -0.397*** -0.265*** 
 (-4.020) (-4.420)  (-3.658) (-3.967)  (-4.552) (-3.690) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.459  0.497 0.437  0.485 0.435 
         
RISKMed (Altman) -0.209** -0.020  -0.093 -0.028  -0.108 -0.043 
 (-2.387) (-0.271)  (-1.084) (-0.354)  (-1.277) (-0.538) 
RISKHigh (Altman) -0.048 -0.091  -0.095 -0.030  -0.105 -0.056 
 (-0.517) (-1.308)  (-1.099) (-0.362)  (-1.173) (-0.759) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
Adjusted R2 0.437 0.452  0.489 0.430  0.476 0.428 
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Panel B. Dependent variable: Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 
 
 
CEOs 
only 
Non-CEO 
executives 
only 
 
Internal 
promotions 
External 
hires 
 
Executive age 
above median 
Executive age 
below median 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
RISKMed (BSM) -0.140** -0.139***  -0.198*** -0.077  -0.154*** -0.143** 
 (-2.077) (-2.982)  (-3.377) (-1.370)  (-2.766) (-2.438) 
RISKHigh (BSM) -0.179** -0.130**  -0.158** -0.127  -0.163** -0.149** 
 (-2.125) (-2.037)  (-2.131) (-1.640)  (-2.286) (-1.963) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.507  0.540 0.511  0.544 0.484 
         
RISKMed (C&J) -0.108* -0.110***  -0.168*** -0.046  -0.133*** -0.116** 
 (-1.718) (-2.757)  (-3.307) (-0.970)  (-2.922) (-2.216) 
RISKHigh (C&J) -0.214*** -0.205***  -0.216*** -0.199***  -0.197*** -0.254*** 
 (-3.480) (-4.146)  (-3.325) (-3.748)  (-3.972) (-3.954) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
Adjusted R2 0.506 0.510  0.543 0.515  0.548 0.487 
         
RISKMed (Altman) -0.176*** -0.029  -0.115* -0.010  -0.044 -0.097 
 (-2.807) (-0.560)  (-1.834) (-0.181)  (-0.788) (-1.592) 
RISKHigh (Altman) 0.026 -0.046  -0.045 0.025  -0.013 -0.039 
 (0.377) (-0.883)  (-0.732) (0.420)  (-0.246) (-0.614) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.504  0.538 0.510  0.543 0.481 
 
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Equity-based /Total Compensation 
 
 
CEOs 
only 
Non-CEO 
executives 
only 
 
Internal 
promotions 
 
External 
hires 
 
 
Executive age 
above median 
 
Executive age 
below median 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
RISKMed (BSM) -0.053 -0.094***  -0.088*** -0.087**  -0.108*** -0.051 
 (-1.150) (-3.064)  (-2.584) (-1.996)  (-2.680) (-1.437) 
RISKHigh (BSM) -0.166*** -0.144***  -0.148*** -0.161***  -0.198*** -0.109** 
 (-2.978) (-3.389)  (-3.354) (-2.761)  (-3.949) (-2.296) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
         
RISKMed (C&J) -0.066 -0.061**  -0.068** -0.041  -0.106*** -0.017 
 (-1.542) (-2.050)  (-2.167) (-1.028)  (-2.639) (-0.554) 
RISKHigh (C&J) -0.130*** -0.118***  -0.113*** -0.129***  -0.203*** -0.048 
 (-2.705) (-3.354)  (-2.657) (-2.975)  (-4.795) (-1.199) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
         
RISKMed (Altman) -0.074 0.011  0.024 -0.040  -0.028 0.008 
 (-1.635) (0.360)  (0.702) (-0.938)  (-0.749) (0.198) 
RISKHigh (Altman) -0.097* -0.031  -0.050 -0.041  -0.058 -0.040 
 (-1.864) (-0.937)  (-1.207) (-0.902)  (-1.269) (-1.012) 
No. of observations 1,059 2,555  1,952 1,662  1,930 1,684 
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Table 6 
Regressions of executive compensation for subsamples based on corporate diversification. 
This table examines the relation between various measures of executive compensation and financial distress risk for diversified 
firms and non-diversified firms, respectively. Diversified firms are firms that operate in two or more four-digit SIC code industries 
and non-diversified firms are those operate in only one four-digit SIC code industry. Dependent variables are the logarithm of total 
compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), logarithm of cash-based compensation, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), and fraction of 
equity-based compensation, Equity-based/Total Compensation. We use OLS regressions to estimate total compensation and cash-
based compensation, and Tobit regressions for the fraction of equity-based compensation. RISKMed and RISKHigh are dummy 
variables equal to one for firms with medium and high levels of distress risk, respectively. The three financial distress risk indicators 
are based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model and Altman (1968)’s z-score model. 
For brevity, we report only the coefficients for the financial distress risk variables. The same set of controls as in Table 3 is included. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. t- Statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include industry dummies that 
are based on the 12 Fama-French industries, and year dummies. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Total Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Equity-based/Total Compensation 
 Diversified Non-diversified  Diversified Non-diversified Diversified Non-diversified 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
RISKMed (BSM) -0.208** -0.261*** -0.104* -0.171*** -0.092** -0.091** 
 (-2.330) (-3.351) (-1.815) (-2.964) (-2.270) (-2.254) 
RISKHigh (BSM) -0.625*** -0.135 -0.325*** -0.051 -0.245*** -0.096* 
 (-4.565) (-1.354) (-3.578) (-0.679) (-4.282) (-1.783) 
No. of observations 1,606 2,008 1,606 2,008 1,606 2,008 
Adjusted R2 0.538 0.365 0.625 0.418 − − 
       
   
  
  
RISKMed (C&J) -0.203*** -0.096 -0.117** -0.067 -0.093** -0.025 
 (-2.724) (-1.523) (-2.355) (-1.336) (-2.437) (-0.718) 
RISKHigh (C&J) -0.428*** -0.228*** -0.271*** -0.147*** -0.166*** -0.102** 
 (-4.150) (-2.846) (-3.723) (-2.582) (-3.552) (-2.245) 
No. of observations 1,606 2,008 1,606 2,008 1,606 2,008 
Adjusted R2 0.536 0.364 0.627 0.417 − − 
       
   
  
  
RISKMed (Altman) -0.082 -0.057 -0.055 -0.083 -0.038 0.028 
 (-0.896) (-0.622) (-0.919) (-1.255) (-1.022) (0.578) 
RISKHigh (Altman) 0.120 -0.078 -0.162* -0.032 -0.033 -0.043 
 (0.820) (-1.178) (-1.664) (-0.636) (-0.538) (-1.081) 
No. of observations 1,606 2,008 1,606 2,008 1,606 2,008 
Adjusted R2 0.526 0.360 0.621 0.415 − − 
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Table 7 
Baseline regressions with additional executive characteristics. 
This table examines the relation between various measures of executive compensation and financial distress risk, controlling for additional executive characteristics, i.e., number 
of current board positions, college degree, and MBA degree. Dependent variables are the logarithm of total compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), logarithm of cash-based 
compensation, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), and fraction of equity-based compensation, Equity-based/Total Compensation. We use OLS regressions to estimate total 
compensation and cash-based compensation, and Tobit regressions for the fraction of equity-based compensation. The independent variables of main interest are RISKMed and 
RISKHigh, which are dummy variables equal to one for firms with medium and high levels of financial distress risk, respectively. The three financial distress risk indicators are 
based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model and Altman (1968)’s z-score model. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 of 
the Appendix. t- Statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
regressions include industry dummies that are based on the 12 Fama-French industries, and year dummies. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Total Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Equity-based/Total Compensation 
  BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
RISKMed -0.243*** -0.204*** -0.053 -0.176*** -0.127*** -0.074 -0.071** -0.081*** 0.009 
 (-3.353) (-3.238) (-0.654) (-3.230) (-2.804) (-1.262) (-2.058) (-2.645) (0.264) 
RISKHigh -0.300*** -0.283*** -0.100 -0.162** -0.195*** -0.051 -0.122*** -0.103*** -0.046 
 (-3.056) (-3.992) (-1.342) (-2.254) (-3.834) (-0.947) (-2.626) (-2.946) (-1.287) 
Ln(Sales) 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (8.785) (8.973) (8.719) (10.140) (10.340) (10.140) (2.946) (2.928) (2.750) 
Leverage 0.604*** 0.668*** 0.560*** 0.516*** 0.562*** 0.498*** 0.135** 0.161*** 0.114** 
 (4.696) (5.074) (4.253) (5.523) (5.832) (5.340) (2.495) (2.909) (2.031) 
ROA 0.245*** 0.206** 0.205** 0.203*** 0.178*** 0.184*** 0.037 0.020 0.016 
 (2.952) (2.392) (2.230) (3.389) (2.891) (2.777) (0.883) (0.472) (0.365) 
Tobin's Q 0.016 0.022 0.021 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.014** 0.016** 0.016** 
 (1.111) (1.547) (1.465) (-0.140) (0.311) (0.148) (2.159) (2.487) (2.477) 
Cash Holding 0.212* 0.240** 0.248** 0.290*** 0.305*** 0.310*** -0.077 -0.066 -0.065 
 (1.763) (2.041) (2.108) (3.206) (3.442) (3.517) (-1.285) (-1.117) (-1.086) 
Stock Return 0.166*** 0.158*** 0.193*** 0.078** 0.072** 0.095*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.076*** 
 (3.777) (3.603) (4.428) (2.510) (2.301) (3.081) (3.249) (3.154) (3.792) 
Stock Volatility 0.071 -0.114 -0.209* -0.052 -0.144* -0.211*** 0.094 0.019 -0.015 
 (0.434) (-1.019) (-1.833) (-0.462) (-1.902) (-2.796) (1.243) (0.362) (-0.282) 
 60 
 
 
Independent Directors 1.232*** 1.207*** 1.232*** 0.851*** 0.837*** 0.855*** 0.364*** 0.353*** 0.363*** 
 (9.318) (9.058) (9.291) (8.494) (8.246) (8.517) (6.364) (6.146) (6.341) 
3% or above / Total 
Institutional Ownership -0.571*** -0.570*** -0.587*** -0.506*** -0.501*** -0.513*** -0.024 -0.025 -0.033 
 (-5.924) (-6.037) (-6.101) (-7.138) (-7.172) (-7.235) (-0.574) (-0.612) (-0.782) 
CEO Dummy 0.361*** 0.368*** 0.361*** 0.373*** 0.379*** 0.375*** -0.024 -0.022 -0.025* 
 (11.700) (11.920) (11.670) (17.050) (17.350) (17.130) (-1.617) (-1.462) (-1.654) 
Age 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (2.450) (2.424) (2.448) (4.863) (4.830) (4.859) (-3.055) (-3.094) (-2.997) 
External Hire dummy 0.029 0.032 0.024 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.012 0.008 
 (0.865) (0.981) (0.712) (0.729) (0.832) (0.612) (0.669) (0.772) (0.541) 
 Current Board Positions 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.212*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 
 (6.194) (6.208) (6.269) (5.815) (5.850) (5.934) (4.030) (4.070) (4.128) 
College Degree dummy 0.231*** 0.225*** 0.233*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.166*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 
 (6.234) (6.066) (6.232) (5.985) (5.815) (5.971) (3.349) (3.294) (3.384) 
MBA Degree dummy 0.076 0.077 0.082 0.019 0.021 0.025 0.032 0.031 0.033 
 (1.538) (1.543) (1.633) (0.592) (0.621) (0.739) (1.562) (1.541) (1.611) 
Intercept 9.874*** 9.967*** 10.020*** 10.020*** 10.070*** 10.100*** -0.226* -0.188 -0.179 
 (31.760) (32.700) (33.050) (44.370) (45.180) (45.370) (-1.729) (-1.480) (-1.405) 
No. of observations 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 
Adjusted R2 0.502 0.504 0.498 0.569 0.571 0.566 − − − 
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Table 8 
Baseline estimation results using median regressions. 
This table examines the relation between various measures of executive compensation and financial distress risk using median regressions. Dependent variables are the logarithm of 
total compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), logarithm of cash-based compensation, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), and fraction of equity-based compensation, Equity-based/Total 
Compensation. We use OLS regressions to estimate total compensation and cash-based compensation, and Tobit regressions for the fraction of equity-based compensation. RISKMed 
and RISKHigh  are dummy variables equal to one for firms with medium and high levels of financial distress risk, respectively. The three financial distress risk measures are computed 
using Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model, and Altman (1968)’s z-score model, respectively. For brevity, we report only the coefficients 
for the financial distress risk variables. The same set of controls as in Table 3 is included. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. t -Statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include industry and 
year dummies. Industry dummy variables are based on the 12 Fama-French industries. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Total Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 
Dependent Variable: 
Equity-based/Total Compensation 
  BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman BSM C&J Altman 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
RISKMed -0.225*** -0.142*** -0.098* -0.135*** -0.114*** -0.097*** -1.241*** -1.321*** -0.513 
 (-4.831) (-3.451) (-1.877) (-4.707) (-3.830) (-3.329) (-3.236) (-2.599) (-1.427) 
RISKHigh -0.204*** -0.300*** -0.069 -0.090*** -0.160*** -0.009 -2.467*** -3.252*** -1.295** 
 (-3.380) (-6.300) (-1.243) (-2.725) (-5.491) (-0.278) (-5.438) (-6.824) (-2.560) 
No. of observations 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,614 
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Table 9  
Propensity score matching estimation. 
This table reports the propensity score matching estimation results. Panels A, B, and C report the propensity score matching 
estimates based on Hillegeist et al. (2004)’s BSM model, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s hazard model, and Altman (1968)’s z-score 
model, respectively. The outcome variables include: the logarithm of salary, Ln(Salary), logarithm of bonuses, Ln(Bonus+1), 
logarithm of cash-based pay, Ln(Cash-based Compensation), logarithm of equity-based pay, Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1), 
logarithm of total compensation, Ln(Total Compensation), fraction of equity-based compensation, Equity-based /Total 
Compensation, executive performance incentives, Ln(Delta+1), and risk-taking incentives, Ln(Vega+1). Both the average 
treatment effects (ATEs) and the average treatment effects on the treated (ATETs) are reported together with their respective p-
values. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
No. of 
 Observations 
for ATE ATE p-value 
No. of 
observations 
for ATET ATET p-value 
 
Panel A. High and medium distress risk vs. low distress risk using the BSM model 
  
  
Ln(Salary) 3,580 -0.435*** 0.000 
 
3,602 -0.063 0.373 
Ln(Bonuses+1) 3,580 -3.389*** 0.000 3,602 -0.847** 0.035 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 3,580 -0.573*** 0.000 3,602 -0.151* 0.060 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1) 3,580 -4.358*** 0.000 3,602 -3.185*** 0.000 
Ln(Total Compensation) 3,580 -0.891*** 0.000 3,602 -0.597*** 0.000 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 3,580 -0.195*** 0.000 3,602 -0.199*** 0.000 
Ln(Delta+1) 3,580 -3.801*** 0.001 3,602 -1.425*** 0.000 
Ln(Vega+1) 3,580 -2.621** 0.036 3,602 -1.550*** 0.000 
 
Panel B. High and medium distress risk vs. low distress risk using the C&J model  
  
Ln(Salary+1) 3,614 -0.091*** 0.004 3,614 -0.030 0.370 
Ln(Bonuses+1) 3,614 -0.799*** 0.007 3,614 -0.788** 0.044 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 3,614 -0.131*** 0.000 3,614 -0.066 0.114 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1) 3,614 -0.965** 0.010 3,614 -0.412 0.316 
Ln(Total Compensation) 3,614 -0.204*** 0.000 3,614 -0.109* 0.058 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 3,614 -0.045*** 0.007 3,614 -0.023 0.137 
Ln(Delta+1) 3,614 -0.781*** 0.000 3,614 -0.452** 0.042 
Ln(Vega+1) 3,614 -0.695*** 0.002 3,614 -0.436* 0.064 
 
Panel C. High and medium distress risk vs. low distress risk using the Altman model  
  
Ln(Salary) 3,614 0.044 0.272 3,614 -0.004 0.943 
Ln(Bonuses+1) 3,614 -1.160*** 0.000 3,614 -1.084** 0.013 
Ln(Cash-based Compensation) 3,614 0.016 0.768 3,614 -0.04 0.579 
Ln(Equity-based Compensation+1) 3,614 -0.184 0.742 3,614 -0.224 0.611 
Ln(Total Compensation) 3,614 0.006 0.937 3,614 -0.059 0.493 
Equity-based /Total Compensation 3,614 -0.011 0.562 3,614 -0.008 0.660 
Ln(Delta+1) 3,614 -0.654*** 0.000 3,614 -0.709*** 0.000 
Ln(Vega+1) 3,614 -0.171 0.648 3,614 -0.160 0.512 
 
